INS Report On Riot At Esmor Immigration Facility

U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service

RECEIVED JUL 2 M995

Office of the Commissioner

425 Eye Street N. W.
Washington, D C. 20536

July 21, 1995

Mr. James Slattery, President
ESMOR New Jersey, Inc.
275 Broadhollow Road
Melville, New York 11747

Dear Mr. Slattery:

Enclosed for your review is the Interim Assessment Report
concerning the Elizabeth, New Jersey, contract detention facility
operated by your company for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. Based on the findings it contains, we are prepared to
let this contract lapse.

Doris Meissner
Commissioner

CF 02320

The Elizabeth, New Jersey Contract Detention Facility
Operated by ESMOR Inc.

Interim Report
Executive Summary

Background

On May 30, the Headquarters Detention and Deportation Division (HQDDP) was directed
by Commissioner Meissner to conduct a program review and investigation of the ESMOR contract
detention center located in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Commissioner Meissner directed the review in
response to complaints and allegations of abuse and alleged inappropriate conditions of confinement.
An Assessment Team was assembled with representation from HQDDP, Headquarters Office of
Internal Audit, Eastern Region Detention and Deportation, and the Administrative Center Burlington
Administration (Contracting). The review was conducted from June 7-10 and focused on the facility's
physical plant, its overall operation, and INS oversight of the contract. Subsequent to the review,
a detainee disturbance occurred on June 18, and Commissioner Meissner directed that the
investigation be expanded to examine the probable causes of the disturbance, adequacy of response
by ESMOR and INS personnel, and emergency plans that were in effect at the time of the
disturbance.

Assessment of ESMOR Operations

Based on an overall review, the Assessment Team concludes no real control was exercised
over ESMOR guards by their mid-level supervisors. There was some evidence to support the
allegations of abuse and harassment of detainees which appears to have been conducted by a small
group of ESMOR guards, and usually during the night shift after facility managers had left for the
day. The fact that these incidents occurred during the night shift does not, however, exculpate
ESMOR management from responsibility for the actions of its employees.

Examples of abuses reported to the Assessment Team were serious. ESMOR guards were
implicated in incidents of physical abuse. Theft of detainee property by an ESMOR guard was
reported. These complaints were referred to Headquarters Office of Internal Audit. Aliens with final
orders of removal refused to board flights to their foreign destinations because their funds, valuables,
and property had not been returned by ESMOR employees. Female detainees reported that they had
been issued male underwear on which large question marks had been made in the area of the crotch.
ESMOR guards frequently awakened detainees in the middle of the night, often several times per
night on the pretext of conducting head counts and/or security checks.

Pagel July 20, 1995

CF 02321

The INS Assessment Team found that ESMOR demonstrated a pattern of initiating changes
in policy without prior notification to the INS as required. This practice of modifying existing
policies and/or implementing new ones without properly notifying INS or receiving INS concurrence
materially hindered INS' ability to effectively perform its oversight functions. Moreover, some of the
decisions made by ESMOR had a serious negative impact upon relations between the INS and the
general public since, in the public perception, INS is inextricably linked to the operations of the
Elizabeth facility. The Assessment Team concluded that ESMOR commonly failed to provide, and
in some instances withheld from INS, access to important information regarding daily operations and
problems in the facility.

ESMOR did not have sufficient personnel and was covering the deficiency with large amounts
of overtime. The Assessment Team noted that a high rate of employee turnover and new background
investigations requirements protracting the time period for obtaining clearances were factors in
creating a shortage of ESMOR guards. ESMOR increasingly relied on overtime to compensate for
staffing shortages. The facility has an approximate personnel turnover rate of 60 percent. One factor
in the turnover rate was that, the level of salary, predicated upon Department of Labor Wage
Determination classification, did not ensure the availability of well qualified applicants in the
geographic area where ESMOR is located. Additionally, many of the guards hired by ESMOR did
not meet the requirements of the contract or were only marginally qualified. Some ESMOR guards
were employed in the facility after merely submitting their investigative paperwork to INS but prior
to clearance. Others were employed before receiving the mandatory 40-hour training course.
Although the contract required that ESMOR provide a total of 160 hours of training during each
employee's first year, many employees had not yet met this requirement. The Assessment Team
determined that this task could not be met within the balance of the contract period.

Numerous instances of noncompliance with the terms of the contract were noted by the
Assessment Team. Examples of instances of noncompliance include: clean clothing was not provided
twice weekly; appropriate footwear and undergarments were not provided to detainees as needed;
incident logging was insufficient for INS oversight; and assigned duty posts abandoned or left
unmanned by ESMOR employees.

All physical components of food preparation, service, storage, and disposal were found to be
adequate. Similarly, based upon findings by PHS, the INS Assessment Team concluded that the
individual assessment of detainees who were seen during sick calls was good, although sick call was
not conducted on a daily basis as required under the terms of the contract.

The facility was in good order and the physical plant was in good condition prior to the
disturbance. Despite the fact the facility was supposed to be designed to meet ACA standards,
deficiencies were noted in several areas with regard to American Correctional Association (ACA)
standards. These included access to natural light in some areas; lack of privacy in some toilet and
shower areas; limited outdoor recreation area; and lack of chairs and writing areas in the segregation
cells.

Page 2 July 20, 1995

CF 02322

Government Operations and Contract Oversight

Oversight of the ESMOR operation by the Newark District was minimally effective.
Communication between INS and ESMOR was insufficient. There was no sense of consistency in
the day-to-day operation of the facility or management of the detainees. The staffing structure
adopted by the Newark District did not allow for close oversight of this multimillion dollar contract.
The Newark District changed management of the facility on at least three separate occasions. During
the period of INS staffing changes, ESMOR was able to distance itself from oversight by the INS and
conceal information concerning its operations.

After the June 18 disturbance, some ESMOR detainees were transferred to detention space
within the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia District Office. INS officers in Philadelphia discovered that,
contrary to established INS policy, four juveniles were held in custody at ESMOR, which does have
not have appropriate facilities for juveniles.

An inefficient administrative hearing process at the ESMOR facility resulted in lengthy
processing times and extended periods of detention in the early months of the contract. As a result,
detention costs were high and the removal rate was lower than expected. The INS' contract with
ESMOR failed to include necessary provisions to ensure an efficient hearing process. The Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) did not fully staff the ESMOR facility with judges and clerks.
The INS was also unable to fully staff the facility with trial attorneys and clerks. In some instances,
aliens under exclusion proceedings waited up to four weeks for a hearing after submitting a written
request to withdraw their application for admission to the United States. The Asylum Pre-Screening
program, designed to identify asylum applicants with credible claims for possible parole by the
District Director, was not in place when the facility opened although all detainees who had requested
an asylum pre-screening interview ultimately received one. All of these factors led to an estimated
average length of stay in detention of 100-1 15 days.

The Newark District should have taken a more proactive approach toward responding to
concerns from the community and local pro bono attorneys The District should have seen that
senous problems were developing and responded in a more meaningful manner to concerned parties.
Although the District worked diligently to correct the complaints highlighted by a member of
Congress and attorneys, the Assessment Team found little evidence that the results of these efforts
were communicated to the interested parties. More could have been done to directly reassure and
respond to concerned community interests.

Page 3

July 20, 1995
CF 02323

Review of the ESMOR Disturhanri»

ESMOR did not properly implement its Emergency Plan when needed. ESMOR personnel
were either poorly trained in or unaware of the policy and procedures necessary to operate the facility
in an effective manner.

The disturbance erupted at approximately 1:15 a.m. on June 18. At the time of the
disturbance, there were 14 ESMOR personnel and one INS officer on site. A total of 3 15 detainees
were being housed at the facility at that time. The disturbance was under control by 6:30 a.m. after
atactica! entry was performed by local law enforcement officers. There were no significant injuries
to anyone involved.

The Assessment Team found that the initial cause for the disturbance was to provide a
distraction for detainees who had developed an escape plan. The disturbance began with an assault
on an ESMOR guard carried out by five detainees in an organized manner. A second assault was
made on another ESMOR guard, and the ESMOR duty supervisor ordered all guards to vacate the
facility -- contrary to the Emergency Plan. ESMOR guards had access to riot helmets, batons, and
protective shields, but did not avail themselves of this equipment. After the ESMOR guards
abandoned the facility, the on-site INS Officer directed them to re-enter the facility in an attempt to
establish order. ESMOR personnel refused.

About 15 minutes after the ESMOR guards vacated the facility, the detainees were able to
gain access to the interior hallways of the facility by breaking through the dorm windows. The
Control Room guard failed to release the security door to the female section, trapping the female
guard and uninvolved female detainees inside the facility. During this time, ESMOR guards made
no attempt to regain control of the facility or quell the disturbance other than the control post guard
calling 911, the local emergency assistance number. At 6:00 a.m., SWAT teams entered the facility
and regained control. Order was restored within 15 minutes.

Damage to the facility was limited to the interior of the building and was primarily non-
structural. The most significant damage occurred in the control room area. All monitors, a main
door-control electronic panel, and closed circuit television equipment were damaged or destroyed
Damage to televisions, tables, and offices within the interior of the facility was heav\ Every interior
window in the facility was broken out or damaged. The sinks and toilets were damaged beyond
repair. Some cinder block walls were destroyed. The medical, food service, laundry, and INS areas
sustained no damage; nor was there damage to sensors, alarms, and comfort control systems.

Detainees cited treatment by ESMOR personnel; frustration over time of detention; lack of
communication about their cases; frustration with the hearing process; and deceptive practices by
some private attorneys as underlying causes for the disturbance.

Page 4 July 20, 1995

CF 02324

The Elizabeth, New Jersey
Contract Detention Facility
Operated by ESMOR Inc.

Interim Report

On May 30 the Headquarters Detention and Deportation Division (HQDDP) was directed
by Commissioner Meissner to conduct a program review and investigation of the ESMOR contract
detention center located in Elizabeth, New Jersey. HQDDP assembled an Assessment Team drawn
from the following Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Programs: Headquarters Detention
and Deportation (HQDDP); Headquarters Office of Internal Audit (HQOIA); Eastern Region
Detention and Deportation (RODDP); and Administrative Center Burlington Administration
(ACBADM) - Contracting. An Assistant General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel
(HQCOU) was requested to assist the Team with legal issues and a review of the Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR).

On June 7 through 1 0, a review was conducted of the Elizabeth NJ. Detention Facility, which
is operated by ESMOR Incorporated (hereinafter ESMOR). Areas of particular concern were the
facility's physical plant, its overall operation, and INS oversight of the facility. The review was in
response to numerous complaints and allegations of abuse, inappropriate conditions of confinement,
and of the failure of ESMOR and INS officials to take appropriate corrective action. Complaints
were received by ESMOR, the Newark District Office, and Congressman Robert Menendez, in
whose district the facility is located. The complaints were further highlighted, prior to and during
the review, in several articles in local newspapers. Congressman Menendez, pro bono attorney
organizations, unidentified ESMOR guards, and relatives of detainees also made complaints to the
INS in the detainees behalf.

On June 19, Commissioner Meissner directed the Assessment Team to expand its
investigation of the ESMOR facility to include the detainee disturbance which occurred on June 18.
The expanded investigation examined the probable causes of the disturbance, adequacy of response
by ESMOR and INS personnel, and emergency plans that were in effect at the time of the
disturbance.

July 20, 1995
CF 02325

The damage to the facility caused during the disturbance rendered the facility temporarily
unusable for housing detainees. On July 8, ESMOR advised INS that repairs to the facility have
been completed. ESMOR has requested an inspection by INS at its earliest convenience. While the
physical facility may be available to INS, there are still many open operational and contractual issues
to be addressed prior to the facility once again becoming fully operational.

IL Background and History

A* Wbv Does INS Use Contract Detention Facilities?

In developing its detention strategy, INS has developed the concept of balanced detention
resources. INS utilizes Government owned and operated Service Processing Centers, local jail
space, and contract detention facilities in order to meet its detention needs. INS has used contract
detention facilities since 1984, to complement Government owned facilities. There has never been
a previous instance of a disturbance at a contract facility of the magnitude experienced at the
ESMOR contract facility.

Contract detention facilities comprise nearly 1,100 bed-spaces. This is roughly 16 percent
of the approximately 7,000 total bed-spaces INS has available to detain aliens under deportation
proceedings.

Contract facilities offer a number of advantages to the Government. By soliciting private
contractors to provide bedspace, INS gains the ability to deploy detention capability into needed
locations in a relatively short time. Normally a contract facility can be advertised, awarded, and in
operation in 18-24 months, whereas a Government facility requires 4-5 years to appropriate,
construct, and staff.

One of the biggest advantages of contracts is that they can range from one year to several
years. All contracts have provisions for termination, and longer contracts can include provisions for
periodic renewal and renegotiation of terms. Some contracts allow the vendor to fill unused space
with detainees from other jurisdictions, reducing the requirements for additional facilities. The INS
has shared bedspace with the U.S. Marshals Service and the Bureau of Prisons at several of its
contract detention facilities.

The use of contract detention facilities is a technique for transferring some detention
activities from the Government agencies to the private sector. This is an effective means to
maximize the resources available to the INS.

Page 2

July 20, 1995
CF 02326

IL Solicitation History - Whv ESMOR Was Awarded the Contract

In June 1992 INS Headquarters Office of Contracting and Procurement produced a
solicitation package for the procurement of a 300 bed detention facility in the New York/Newark
area. The procurement package contained a Statement of Work (SOW) provided by HQDDP. This
SOW was developed to be the national guideline for INS detention facilities.

The solicitation was advertised in the Commerce Business Daily in September 1992. The
request for proposals were due and received on December 14, 1992. The award was predicated upon
a combined technical and price formula scoring. In determining the overall score for each proposal
a technical committee reviewed the submissions and provided their evaluations of the contractors
strengths and weakness to the Administrative Center Burlington (ACBADM) Regional Contracting
Officer. The contractors were given the opportunity to address the areas of concern and provide a
revised technical proposal. The technical team re-evaluated the proposals and provided their
assessments on March 5, 1993. Oral discussions were conducted on price and technical issues and
Best and Final Offers (BAFO) were requested from each contractor. The technical committee
evaluated the BAFOs and provided the final technical score to the ACBADM Regional Contracting
Officer.

ESMOR received a total of 145 out of a possible 200 points for their specific technical
approach. The price proposals were evaluated by ACBADM utilizing price analysis techniques in
determining the price reasonableness of the contractor's proposals. The contract was awarded to
ESMOR New Jersey Inc. in August 1993 for a base year amount of 9.3 million dollars. The term
of the contract was for a one year period beginning August 3, 1994 plus four one year option
periods.

Whv Was the Facility Built?

The INS determined that a substantial increase in recent years of malafide applicants
(principally asylum seekers without a credible claim) at both John F. Kennedy International Airport
<: JFKIA) in New York City and Newark International Airport (NEWIA) in Newark. New Jersey was
directly related to the inability of the INS to detain these persons. As part of an overall effort to
better control our borders and discourage illegal immigration, the INS issued and awarded a contract
to build and operate a 300 bed detention facility to hold aliens attempting unlawful entry at JFKIA
andNEWIA.

Prior to the opening of the ESMOR detention facility, the New York District was releasing
an average of 650 to 700 aliens per month from JFKIA. Since the opening of the ESMOR facility
and the increased availability of bedspace, releases at JFKIA and NEWIA, caused by the lack of
bedspace, are believed to have sharply decreased. Exact release figures were requested but not
received as this report is written. The number of applicants for admission in the New York District,

Page 3

July 20, 1995
CF 02327

who were inspected by INS and determined to be malaflde, dropped from a high of 14,000 cases per
year to 7,000 cases in Fiscal Year 1994.

Location and Descriptio n of Facility

The ESMOR detention facility is located in a warehouse district in Elizabeth, New Jersey
within the jurisdiction of the INS Newark District. The facility is rated for a total of 300 detainees!
There is sufficient square footage throughout the facility to support a daily population of 300
detainees and an emergency population of 327 detainees. At the time of the disturbance, INS was
maintaining an average of 300 detainees in the facility; with 315 on the day of the disturbance
Persons detained at the facility were chiefly aliens who were placed under exclusion proceedings
when they attempted to enter the U.S. at JFKIA or NEWIA with fraudulent documents or no
documents. Many of these detainees were applicants for asylum who did not make a credible asvlum
claim to INS.

The facility contains several dormitory style sleeping areas with adjacent day rooms. Each
dormitory has appropriate restroom facilities for use by the detainees. Male and female dormitories
are separated in a manner which provides for privacy between genders and is designed to prevent
viewing from unauthorized areas. In addition to the dormitory areas, the facility is equipped with
support service areas which include a full service medical clinic, full service kitchen preparation and
cleaning area, recreation areas (indoor and outdoor), a law library, and a laundry area.

IIL Assessment of ESMOR Operations

The following areas were addressed during the review of ESMOR's operations:

A.

Detainee Welfare

page

5

B.

Policies / Practices / Emergency Plan

8

C.

Reporting and Internal Controls

12

D.

Staffing and Personnel Issues

14

E.

Training

18

F.

Food Service

20

G.

Medical Care

21

H.

Access to Counsel / EOIR / INS

24

I.

Physical Facility

25

J.

Contract Compliance

27

Page 4 July 20, 1995

CF 02328

As part of the overall assessment of ESMOR, the Assessment Team reviewed operations,
support programs within the facility, and ESMOR' s ability to identify and deal with day-to-day
problems. Additionally, ESMOR's ability to interact and communicate with INS and the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) was evaluated based on concerns of the District, Eastern
Region Detention and Deportation (RODDP), and Headquarters prior to and during the assessment.

The Team reviewed other problem areas as necessary. Two assessment visits were
conducted; the first on June 7 through June 1 and again after the disturbance of June 1 8. The Team
evaluated complaints from the office of Congressman Robert Menendez, and those provided by pro
bono attorney groups, and featured in news media accounts concerning ESMOR. Additional
complaints that were provided to the Assessment Team during the review by detainees and facility
staff were also investigated.

A* Detainee Welfare

The INS has made clear its profound commitment to hold alien detainees only in conditions
that are humane, safe, and secure. This commitment extends to all detention settings, i.e., INS
Service Processing Centers, local jails, and contract detention facilities. Inhumane actions by
personnel responsible for the detention of aliens, or actions which are clearly detrimental to the
welfare, safety, and security of detainees, are insupportable and totally unacceptable to the INS.

The Assessment Team conducted interviews with 24 detainees, five attorneys, various
ESMOR guards, ESMOR Management and INS personnel. From these interviews the Assessment
Team discovered that detainees were subjected to harassment, verbal abuse, and other degrading
actions perpetrated by some ESMOR guards. There were allegations of physical abuse perpetrated
by a small number of ESMOR guards. Of particular concern were the number of complaints
regarding maltreatment of detainees by ESMOR employees working the midnight shift. The
Assessment Team found that complaints of verbal abuse and general disrespect by ESMOR
personnel towards detainees, visitors, and attorneys were credible and that such actions were
common on all shifts. The complaints referencing physical abuse typically focused on actions by
midnight shift employees The Assessment Team concluded that these occurrences were not caused
by uncontrollable or spontaneous anger on the part of ESMOR guards. Rather, the evidence suggests
that these incidents were part of a systematic methodology designed by some ESMOR guards as a
means to control the general detainee population and to intimidate and discipline obstreperous
detainees through the use of corporal punishment.

Several attorneys reported to the Assessment Team that detainees were being harshly treated.
These attorneys, Stephanie Marks, Joyce Phipps, Carmen Mendiola, and Gloria Alfonso stated that
during visits to ESMOR they had observed visible marks and bruises on some of the detainees whom
they represented. Further, these attorneys said it was not uncommon for them to see detainees
pushed up against the wall and treated roughly by contract guards in other ways.

Page 5

July 20, 1995
CF 02329

In addition to the available direct evidence of the attorneys, the Assessment Team was able
to locate a relevant witness who has provided specific information, as part of an ongoing criminal
investigation, concerning many other allegations of abuse. However, various other ESMOR
employees simply refused to talk candidly to Assessment Team members out of fear of retaliation
or potential prosecution. Others were conveniently unavailable. Still others were clearly less than
candid. The following are some examples of abuses reported to the Assessment Team.

Example 1 : In post-disturbance interviews female detainees reported that they had been
issued male underpants. On these underpants, which were generally too
large, a large question mark had been made in the area of the crotch.

Example 2: Detainees reported that on numerous occasions specific ESMOR personnel
refused to issue sanitary napkins to female detainees who were menstruating.

Example 3: Detainees and attorneys reported that, in contravention of facility policy,
ESMOR guards frequently awakened detainees in the middle of the night,
often several times per night. This was done on the pretext of conducting
head counts and/or security checks. The true motive manifestly was to harass
the detainees. When INS officers at the facility were made aware of this
abusive behavior through interviews with detainees, they insured it ceased
immediately.

Example 4: Theft of detainee property by an ESMOR guard was reported. The INS
Assessment Team immediately notified the Office of the Inspector General.

Some of the detainees interviewed were unwilling to provide sworn statements because they
feared retaliation. Nonetheless, the Assessment Team found the complaints to be credible and has
requested that the Office of Internal Audit (HQOIA) assist with a follow-up investigation. Although
no formal allegations of abuse have been filed at this time, HQOIA is pursuing leads that were
developed during the assessment. HQOIA will continue to independently investigate, beyond the
completion of this report, any additional or unresolved claims or allegations that come within its
jurisdiction. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has initiated a Civil Rights Investigation to
determine if any prosecution is warranted for civil rights violations. The primary focus of the FBI
investigation will be ESMOR guards who may have acted in violation of Federal law. Other local
law enforcement agencies are reviewing the disturbance for possible prosecution.

As indicated earlier, some ESMOR employees whom the Team interviewed expressed fears
that cooperation with investigators would make them vulnerable to job termination and possibly
criminal prosecution. It was discovered that some ESMOR mid-level supervisors and guards
specifically cautioned their colleagues of the need to remain silent when questioned by members of
the Assessment Team. This was referred to in at least one employee muster as "maintaining the blue

Page 6 July 20, 1995

CF 02330

wall" (a term sometimes attributed to law enforcement officers, to connote their intention to withhold
information from investigators). Nevertheless, the investigation by the Assessment Team uncovered
the identities of those ESMOR guards principally responsible for the maltreatment of detainees. The
abuser group consisted of five guards and two guard-lieutenants. Six were removed from the
contract, terminated, or allowed to resign by ESMOR. These cases are being examined by INS
Office of Internal Audit for possible prosecution. The seventh guard was identified as a participant
in a single instance of what some characterized as "non-serious harassment." This took place prior
to June 18. The facts of the incident did not sustain a probative finding of harassment. The exact
incident was murky and conflicting information was presented by witnesses. It is clear that the
incident involved only a short verbal confrontation between the guard and a detainee, and the
situation was quickly suppressed by other ESMOR guards who separated the disputers.

Based on an overall review, and confronted with the types of misconduct noted above, the
Assessment Team concludes no real control was exercised over ESMOR guards by their mid-level
supervisors. While the abuse and harassment of detainees happened at hands of a small group of
ESMOR guards, and usually during the night shift after facility managers had left for the day, this
does not exculpate ESMOR management from responsibility for the actions of its employees.

Recommendations:

a. ESMOR should be required to submit to the INS for review and approval a policy
and procedure which describes what steps will be taken to notify the INS COTR of
any incidents which involve a detainee. Some examples are:

assault by a detainee on an ESMOR employee (or vice versa) or other
detainee.

incidents requiring placement of detainees in segregation.

incidents requiring the use of non-routine restraints inside the secure
perimeter of the facility, i.e., combative detainees, precautionary due to threat

of violence etc

incident, or complaint by detainee, alleging misconduct by ESMOR
personnel. All incident reports are to be followed with detailed investigations
and conclusions as well as identification of disciplinary action taken where
complaints are proved.

b. ESMOR should be required to provide INS copies of complaints made against
ESMOR employees. They must include complaints by the general public, attorneys,
or other private or public interest groups. This would apply to complaints concerning
treatment of detainees and/or conditions of confinement. ESMOR must also provide

Page 7 July 20, 1995

CF 02331

to the INS COTR for his follow-up, a copy of their response if any, and a report of
what actions they took to resolve the complaint.

1L Policies / Practices / Em ergency Plan

Deficiencies related to policies, practices, and the emergency plan were found during the
review of the ESMOR facility and operations.

Policies:

On March 17 RODDP was advised by Officer Norman Uzzle, the INS COTR (the
Contracting Officer's Technical Representative is the on-site person who monitors contractor
compliance with the contract), that ESMOR had initiated a practice of using leg restraints on every
detainee as a means of preventing escapes during visitation and court hearings. Uzzle notified
RODDP by faxing them a March 16 newspaper article that outlined the practice. On March 23,
ESMOR was notified by INS' Administrative Center Burlington (ACBADM), which administers the
ESMOR contract, to cease this practice. The reason for the delay in issuing the notice was that
ACBADM had to await an investigation of the incident.

During April, RODDP was notified by Officer Uzzle that ESMOR management had initiated
a practice of charging aliens for lost items which ESMOR is required to supply under the terms of
the contract. Examples of these items were eating utensils, clothing, drinking cups, etc. Officer
Uzzle only became aware of this situation when he discovered a memo notifying the detainees of
this practice. ESMOR was requested to provide information to ACBADM regarding this practice.
ESMOR responded by rescinding the policy.

Another serious policy violation was alleged during a confidential interview with an ESMOR
guard. The guard revealed that placement of detainees into segregation without a charging document
was a frequent occurrence. This would be a violation of ESMOR's policy and procedures as well as
the standards of the American Correctional Association (ACA) which INS requires contract
detention facilities to follow (although the facility is only required to "seek ACA accreditation"
within nine months of opening). According to the interviewed guard, the segregation unit was used
as a means both of punishing detainees for relatively minor offenses, and for more general
harassment. This activity took place primarily on the night shifts. Similar unsolicited charges were
made by various attorneys interviewed by the Assessment Team. Attorneys further charged that
when an attorney would question the placement of a detainee into segregation and demand an
explanation, the attorney would be denied this information by ESMOR managers. Significantly,
however, the detainee would quickly be released back into the general population. The credibility"
of these charges was validated when on June 14 Officer Uzzle notified ESMOR that he had found,
m the segregation unit, a detainee who had no offenses listed on his information sheet.

Page 8 July 20, 1995

CF 02332

The Assessment Team cannot, without further review and detainee interviews, determine the
scope of this practice. ESMOR advised the Team that disciplinary files were destroyed during the
recent disturbance. Thus, it is virtually impossible to provide any documentation regarding which
detainees received a disciplinary panel hearing. Further detainee interviews, which may provide
additional information, are being conducted by INS Special Agents in the Philadelphia District
where the aliens are currently detained. The results of these investigations were not available as this
report was written.

Practices:

Missed flight and missing property -

Aliens who had been served with a final notice for removal and for whom departure
arrangements had been made often missed their flights. This was generally due to two specific
causes. First, early in the contract period, ESMOR personnel often missed flights or forgot to
deliver aliens to the airport. Corrective action was taken to better coordinate airport turnarounds and
removals from the facility. Second, ESMOR personnel attempted to deport aliens without returning
their funds, valuables, and property; a clear violation of both INS' and ESMOR's policy and
procedures. Many aliens, properly, refused to get on aircraft without their funds and valuables.
They were returned to the facility. Where the delays caused by this procedure resulted in additional
man-days being charged to the INS, appropriate deductions were subsequently made by the INS
COTR.

Through a review of the INS COTR's files, the Assessment Team found this continued to
be a problem even though ESMOR had been notified by the COTR in May that corrective action was
needed.

Policy changes without notification -

The INS Assessment Team found that ESMOR demonstrated a pattern of initiating changes
in policy without prior notification to the INS via its COTR, as required under the contract. This
practice of modifying existing policies and'or implementing new ones without properly notifying
INS or receiving INS concurrence materially hindered INS* ability to effectively perform its
oversight functions. Moreover, some of the decisions made by ESMOR had a serious negative
impact upon relations between the INS and the general public since, in the public perception, INS
is inextricably linked to the operations of the Elizabeth facility.

Emergency Plan:

The Assessment Team made a preliminary review of the ESMOR facility emergency plan
and its implementation. The Team interviewed Mr. Willard Stovall, ESMOR Facility Administrator,
and Officer Michael Rozos, INS Officer in Charge at the Facility. The facility emergency plan was

Page 9 July 20, 1995

CF 02333

reviewed for comment, prior to the opening of the facility, by INS representatives from the Newark
and New York Districts. Recommended changes were given to ESMOR for incorporation into a
final policy. There is no evidence of any follow-up by the Newark District to see if any of these
changes were incorporated.

The Assessment Team found that a serious contract deficiency exists, in that there is no
requirement in the contract for INS to approve policies and procedures for this detention facility;
including the emergency plans. Even so, ESMOR did not properly implement the plan when needed.
ESMOR personnel were either poorly trained in or unaware of the policy and procedures contained
in the emergency plan. The Assessment Team found that Newark District did not properly monitor
ESMOR's training for emergencies throughout the contract period to ensure a proper level of
competence in the guard staff.

Numerous elements listed under ESMOR Policy 8-1 as factors which may contribute to a riot
were extant in the facility prior to June 18. ESMOR was aware of the existence in the facility of
circumstances listed as warning signs in their policy, having been so informed, along with INS staff
at ESMOR, by members of the Assessment Team during the period June 7-10. Those elements
identified by the Assessment Team were:

1 . Complaints about food.

2. Dissatisfaction with certain staff.

3. Complaints about medical treatment.

4. Complaints regarding privileges.

5. Any large increase in detainee complaints (as featured in disciplinary reports).

6. Misinformation relayed to detainees.

Additionally, the Assessment Team reminded both ESMOR and INS staff that conditions
existed that were also later identified as being part of ESMOR Policy 8-1. The plan includes the
following caution: "Prompt detection and reporting of a bad climate within the detention facility may
allow timely changes and avoidance of incidents that could lead to riots. Indicators might be a
detainee's sullen, restless, easily excitable behavior and his avoiding contact with employees."

The Team found that, in large degree, the failure of the policy and procedures was
attributable to the lack of training and experience in the case of most of the ESMOR guards. The
deficiency in the amount of guard training added to the already volatile environment. Moreover,
many of the guards had no actual experience in the detention and handling of people. Faced with
an emerging disturbance, the employees adopted an every-person-for-himself mentality and fled the
facility.

The Assessment team has further reviewed procedures which are outlined in the emergency
plans under "Steps to be Taken" page 3 of Policy 8-1, ESMOR Emergency Plans. As outlined under

Page 10 July 20, 1995

CF 02334

the procedures, the facility riot plan should have been promptly activated in conformity with the
following:

1 . Containment of Rioters:

a. Staff should take immediate steps to secure any avenue of escape

b. All areas should be secured to localize and prevent the disorder from
spreading

c. Assessment of the situation should be made prior to committing staff which
could result in their being taken hostage.

However, the Assessment Team concluded after interviews of ESMOR personnel and Officer
Uzzle that ESMOR guards did not take any steps on their own to prevent escape or secure the
perimeter. ESMOR guards took no action to prevent the disorder from spreading. Guards withdrew
from the facility and took no action other than to call the local emergency services via 911.
Furthermore, the ESMOR duty supervisor failed to take appropriate steps which would ensure
ESMOR staff and innocent detainees were not placed in undue jeopardy. The Team concluded that
the duty supervisor followed no procedure to account for personnel under his charge, and ensure that
all personnel departed the facility. ESMOR staff further failed to properly evacuate and remove
female detainees who were clearly not involved in the initial disturbance. Their failure to respond
appropriately to this emergency and follow ESMOR policy directly caused one female guard to be
taken hostage and placed the female detainees in potentially life-threatening circumstances.

The Assessment Team concluded that the duty supervisor made a serious error in his decision
to order an evacuation of guards under the existing circumstances. Moreover, his decision was not
made in conformity with ESMOR Policy 8-1.

INS Response Force

Within the ESMOR Emergency Response Policy (8-1), reference is made to an INS response
force. Within the Newark District, there is no approved INS Emergency Response Force or Team.
What does exist is simply an ad hoc identification of appropriate personnel, including Special
Agents, Detention and Deportation personnel and other INS enforcement personnel, who may be
contacted during an emergency. The Assessment Team found no evidence of any specialized
training performed within the District which would prepare these personnel to work as a single unit
in the event of an emergency at ESMOR.

Availability of Plan to Emergency Services

In statements and reports published in the news media immediately after the disturbance, City
of Elizabeth, County, and Emergency Services officials claimed that ESMOR and INS had failed
to provide necessary emergency plans and information related to the facility.

Page 11 July 20, 1995

CF 02335

The Assessment Team found that prior to the opening of the facility, ESMOR and INS
officials met with City of Elizabeth Emergency Services personnel. These meetings included the
Fire and Police Departments. Then ESMOR Facility Administrator, John Lima, provided physical
plant plans and tours of the facility. Additional tours were provided to Special Weapons and Tactical
Team representatives as a means to acquaint them with the facility, in case their services were ever
needed. Subsequent meetings with local officials were held periodically throughout 1994. Both
Mr. Lima and Officer Rozos verified that these meetings had taken place as characterized above.
Copies and documentation referencing these meetings have been requested. The Assessment Team
concludes that ESMOR and INS did establish appropriate liaison with local Emergency Services
entities and provided them with sufficient information upon which to safely and effectively respond
to an emergency at the ESMOR facility.

a. ESMOR should be required to notify the INS COTR in writing of every change in
policy and procedures subject to the contract.

b. INS should physically inspect the segregation unit daily.

c. INS should require ESMOR to develop and implement a sound transportation policy
which ensures that aliens depart on scheduled flights with all property, funds and
valuables, as required under the contract.

d. ESMOR must provide tighter controls over the processing, storage, and accounting
of personal property. ESMOR needs to develop an auditable procedure for assuring
the proper safeguards of all detainee property.

e. The contract should be modified to require that INS more closely monitor the quality
of ESMOR training.

f. The District should develop an emergency response plan to react to emergent
situations at the facility.

g. Require formal INS approval of all contract policies and procedures.

£* Reporting and Internal Controls

The Assessment Team found that because of a longstanding ESMOR practice of keeping
information from INS, the Service had little knowledge of specific problems or concerns of detainees
the custody of ESMOR. The Facility Administrator, Willard Stovall consistently referred to the
facility as "my house" in a manner indicative of his apparent belief that INS should not participate

Page 12 July 20, 1995

CF 02336

in day-to-day matters related to detainees. The Assessment Team determined that the strained
relationship between the INS COTR and Mr. Stovall was chiefly due to ESMOR's failure to provide
INS COTR Uzzle with vital information and, its unresponsiveness in taking timely required
corrective actions. This finding is supported in memoranda provided to the Assessment Team by
Officer Uzzle. At the time of the assessment, there was no sign of any sort of partnership between
ESMOR and INS in the operation of the facility. Regular and timely communication between
ESMOR and the INS was nearly non-existent.

As reported to the Assessment Team by Officer Uzzle in person, followed by his
memorandum, "One evening late in May or early June, I was having a conversation with ESMOR's
Facility Manager, Willard Stovall. In that conversation he stated that it was ESMOR's Corporate
policy to keep INS in the dark as much as possible about any problems or incidents which occurred
with regard to the facility, i.e., ' if INS doesn't ask for it, don't volunteer or give them anything.'
Before Mr. Stovall made this statement, he stated it was 'off the record."

It is clear that Mr. Stovall was well aware of the practice of withholding information from
the INS. For example, ESMOR routinely failed to notify the INS COTR of the terminations and
resignations of ESMOR staff. ESMOR is not required under contract to notify INS of the specific
reasons why employees are removed from the employee roster, however, ESMOR must notify INS
of the date each person leaves and the name of the departing employee. Furthermore, staffing
information provided to the Assessment Team by ESMOR did not match names on daily schedules.
Prior unsuccessful attempts, on at least three documented occasions, by ACBADM and RODDP to
obtain accurate employee records from ESMOR resulted in remedial action by the Region to remove
from the facility ESMOR guards who had not received the proper security clearance.

The Assessment Team concluded that ESMOR commonly failed to provide, and in some
instances withheld from INS, access to important information regarding daily operations and
problems in the facility.

Recommendations:

a. ESMOR should provide to INS al! incident and disciplinary report> on ESMOR
, personnel. If necessary, the contract should be modified to reflect this to ensure

compliance. (Re: In terminations, suspensions, and any other personnel actions taken,
the finding must be reported) Through this procedure INS would have had a much
clearer picture of contract employee behavioral problems.

b. The contract should be modified to allow the COTR more direct authority to
intervene in practices which may adversely affect the INS. Four days is an
unacceptable period of time to wait for corrective notices.

Page 13 July 20, 1995

CF 02337

H Staffing and Personnel

Staffing Inadequacies:

The staffing levels at the ESMOR facility were determined by the technical proposal
submitted by ESMOR and accepted by the Government. Their proposal stated that the facility
required 127 full time equivalent (FTE) employees to operate on a 24 hour basis. It should be noted
that ESMOR was only required to meet the number of FTEs they proposed, while the actual number
of staff on their payroll was left to ESMOR's discretion. It is noted throughout this assessment that
ESMOR utilized excessive amounts of overtime in order to meet the requirements of their proposal.

The Assessment Team noted that excessive overtime, a high rate of employee turnover, and
new background investigation requirements protracting the time period for obtaining clearances were
factors in creating a shortage of ESMOR guards. Over the course of the facility's operation, ESMOR
increasingly relied on overtime to compensate for staffing shortages. Approximately two months
ago, ESMOR accelerated a practice of "double-shifting", i.e., requiring employees to work two
consecutive eight hour shifts. The Assessment Team found, based on statements by ESMOR
Facility Administrator Willard Stovall , that this was done in order to cover mandatory posts. Mr.
Stovall conceded, after presentation of the facts by the Assessment Team, that ESMOR did not have
sufficient personnel and was covering the deficiency with large amounts of overtime.

During the assessment, ESMOR personnel were routinely observed at locations other than
their assigned posts. On three separate occasions during the assessment, the main entrance post (a
two-person post) was understaffed. The single guard on duty (not the same person in each instance)
was visibly frustrated. In another instance, people entering the facility were setting off a metal
detector while the ESMOR guard assigned to monitor the device was at the coffee wagon outside
the door. The metal detector is a principal deterrent to prevent the introduction of weapons or
contraband into the facility.

Recreation was often supervised by having either the roving guard maintain a stationary post
or by having the nearest dorm guard provide for both recreation and dormitory security. The result
was that some housing units were left unsupervised.

Officer Uzzle and Officer Boyer, Acting Officer In Charge, reported that within hours of the
departure of the Assessment Team from Newark, they observed some ESMOR guards leaving their
posts unattended or in the process of leaving them unattended until they realized they were under
observation. These discrepancies were noted and the Regional Contracting Officer was notified.

Population Level in Facility:

In March the facility population was reduced by INS due to concerns by ACBADM and
RODDP that ESMOR was unable to perform adequately at a population level of 300 detainees. One

Page 14

July 20, 1995
CF 02338

of the Region's concerns was that the facility was under-staffed and ESMOR seemed unable to
provide an appropriate level of staffing or was unwilling to devise a strategy to maintain the
appropriate minimum staffing level.

In April after ESMOR demonstrated that its personnel had received security clearances, and
after problems had been addressed concerning the excessive number of escapes (27 between August
3, 1994 and January 15, 1995), excessive medical referrals (noted by Public Health Service), and
training issues, INS once again permitted an increase in the facility population.

Staffing During the Disturbance:

At the request of the Assessment Team, RODDP reviewed documentation detailing ESMOR
staffing for two consecutive eight hour shifts on June 18, the night of the disturbance. RODDP
found that nine of the 13 ESMOR guards on duty were in their second consecutive eight-hour shift.
This is particularly significant in view of the fact that several days before the disturbance INS
Regional and District officials had begun actively considering lowering the facility population by
the transfer of 75 detainees. This action was under consideration because of concerns over
ESMOR's inability to properly staff the facility without requiring guards to work double shifts. On
the Friday afternoon before the disturbance, INS notified ESMOR that 1 1 guards could not work due
to lack of suitability waivers. In response to this notification, ESMOR assured INS District officials
that a sufficient number of guards were available to work the weekend shift without compromising
the staffing requirements or negatively impacting security.

ESMOR knew, or should have known, of its inadequate staffing situation and how hazardous
it could be to continue to operate in that mode. Additionally, ESMOR reasonably should have
known, and properly responded to, the expected decrease in staff efficiency that must inevitably
result when staff are required to work double shifts over a extended period (in this case, for months).

It is the finding of the Team that, based on existing knowledge of ESMOR staffing practices,
the Newark District and RODDP did not exercise due caution in verifying ESMOR's claim that they
had available, and had assigned sufficient staff to cover the facility on the weekend of June 17-18.

Recruitment of Guards:

A problem cited by ESMOR was recruiting qualified personnel to perform the duties in the
facility. The Assessment Team has requested Newark District to conduct a review of current
personnel records (provided by ESMOR) to verify what qualifications staff members had for security
positions involving the detention of aliens or persons in custody. ESMOR's failure to recruit
sufficiently qualified applicants and to dismiss questionable or marginal personnel, was a
contributing factor in the abuse of detainees. ESMOR failed to provide a recruiting plan that
addressed its staffing problems in a realistic manner. According to the records of Administrative
Center Burlington Office of Security (ACBSEC), this facility has an approximate personnel turnover

Page 15 July 20, 1995

CF 02339

rate of 60 percent. ESMOR should have addressed its serious labor problem in a more responsible
manner.

Classification and Salary of Guards:

Contract guard positions required under the contract are defined by the Department of Labor
as "Security Guard II" for minimum salary determination. It appeared that this salary level did not
support an adequate level of qualified applicants to operate the facility.

The duties and responsibilities of a guard in a detention setting are closely analogous to those
of a Correctional Officer or Detention Enforcement Officer. The "Security Guard II" position relates
more closely to a guard in a warehouse. In brief, the "Security Guard II" standard related more to
one who guards "things", where ESMOR obviously needed guards who deal with people as well as
things. The typical warehouse guard does not earn a wage that is as high as a guard who is also
responsible for the welfare and security of persons.

ESMOR's salary structure was adopted as part of their competitive pricing strategy. As such,
it was responsible in part for ESMOR being awarded the contract. However, it appears that the level
of salary was not realistic and could not, in the area where ESMOR is located, ensure the
availability of well qualified applicants. It is evident that many, if not most, of the guards hired by
ESMOR did not meet the requirements of the contract or were only marginally qualified. In the end,
they proved unable to maintain control of the facility or ensure detainee and facility safety and
security.

Mr. Willard Stovall ESMOR Facility Administrator told the Assessment Team that he was
unable to replace a number of undesirable employees because ESMOR did not have a pool of
qualified applicants from which they could draw immediate replacements. Several of the
undesirable employees were later identified as guards who were suspected of abusive behavior
toward detainees.

Security Clearances:

Evidence indicates ESMOR employed individuals as guards in the facility after merely
submitting their investigative paperwork to INS. This resulted in uncleared guards working in the
facility and was another reason why the detainee population was reduced in March. The contract
clearly states that this practice is not permissible. This practice should have been detected and
prevented by the COTR and the Regional Security Officer. ESMOR was told to cease this practice
in March, after ACBADM, RODDP, and ACBSEC compared ESMOR employment records against
ACBADM security records. This problem was corrected before the population level was restored.
In June a list of personnel approved by Security was again compared to a list of personnel on the job
site. The comparison, performed by Eastern Region Detention and Deportation (RODDP) and
Administrative Center Burlington Administration (ACBADM), once again showed numerous

Page 16

July 20, 1995

CF 02340

uncleared personnel were on duty at the facility. Before INS could take specific action to correct
this situation, the June 18 disturbance intervened.

The process and procedures for requesting and approving security clearances were seriously
flawed at all levels including the ACBSEC, the District, and ESMOR. The error rate of investigative
forms received from ESMOR by the Regional Administrative Center Security Officer (ACBSEC)
was unacceptably high. Nearly every investigation was delayed by days if not weeks for corrections.
INS and ESMOR share some of the responsibility here, for if the proper procedure had been
followed, the completed forms should have been reviewed and corrected by ESMOR and the COTR
prior to being received by the ACBSEC. This would have resulted in a much lower error rate and
significantly decreased processing time.

The ACBSEC forwarded fingerprints to the Headquarters Office of Security (HQSEC) by
regular mail. This process took as long as seven days in some cases. Furthermore, there was no
consistency in the manner for which waivers were granted, and follow-up by the ACBSEC and the
COTR was poor.

On two separate occasions, RODDP and ACBADM intervened and removed numerous
ESMOR personnel from the facility as a direct result of the failure of ESMOR to obtain the
appropriate security clearances for its employees. On those occasions, the Region was unable to
obtain an accurate list of current employees from ESMOR and similarly unable to obtain an accurate
list of cleared applicants or employees from the ACBSEC. As a result, those employees working
at the facility and for whom no security clearance had been granted, were ordered off the site until
the appropriate security clearance was obtained.

Recommendations:

a. ESMOR must provide satisfactory written evidence of appropriate staffing levels to
INS under the terms of the contract. An INS review should be conducted monthly for
the life of the contract to ensure compliance with minimum staffing requirements set
out in the contract.

b. INS should require ESMOR to provide an exact staffing plan for detainee
populations of 200, 250, and 300 before the facility is reopened. These staffing plans
should be monitored, and ESMOR should be required to comply with reporting
requirements including, but not limited to, notifications of personnel on staff,
suspensions, and terminations. If necessary the contract should be modified to
reflect this change.

c. Newark District should more closely monitor the facility population level and, with
Region, act more quickly to reduce the population level when necessary.

Page 17 July 20, 1995

CF 02341

d. The contract should be modified to reflect the necessary classification change in the
guard series, to attract better qualified applicants.

e. Newark District/Region should exercise increased vigilance to ensure all ESMOR
on-duty staff have proper clearances or waivers.

f. Based upon the past performance of the Security Officer and the lack of confidence
expressed by RODDP, HQSEC should continue its review and assessment of the
Administrative Center Burlington Office of Security and, if necessary, institute
systemic improvements.

g. Remedial training or hands-on informational training should be provided to ensure
there is no repetition of problems utilizing the security clearance procedures.

E* Training

Under the terms of the contract, ESMOR is required to provide a minimum of 40 hours of
orientation and basic training to all employees prior to placement on the job. All newly selected
ESMOR security personnel are required to complete a minimum of 160 hours (including the 40
hours noted above) of training within the first year of employment. The Assessment Team made the
following findings based upon memoranda and charts obtained from ESMOR management, ESMOR
personnel files, and INS Regional records.

Prior to the opening of the ESMOR facility, a comprehensive training program was initiated
using a curriculum reviewed and approved by the then INS COTR Officer Michael Rozos. The
curriculum as presented exceeded the requirements by eight hours for a total of 168 hours during the
first year of employment for all security personnel.

ESMOR records indicate training was provided as required to employees hired in June, 1994
(the facility was opened August 3, 1994). There were no trackable records to indicate ESMOR
complied with the contract requirement after the initial training session was provided. Therefore,
the Assessment Team requested a full review of facility personnel files to determine dates when
personnel entered on duty and whether or not they received the required training.

This review determined that ESMOR was assigning personnel to security assignments
without meeting any minimum training requirements. The last known training session according
to ESMOR records was held from March 23 through March 27. The Assessment Team found that
the training class was scheduled by ESMOR only after INS discovered approximately 32 percent of
the security personnel assigned to ESMOR did not have the required security clearance, and
informed ESMOR that they could no longer use these personnel inside the facility. ESMOR took
this opportunity to provide them with the initial required training. Fourteen ESMOR personnel

Page 18

July 20, 1995
CF 02342

received training at that time, consisting of forty hours of orientation and basic training required for
new employees. Of the 14, all had been employed as security guards with the company at least two
months. Ten had been employed in or prior to November 1994. This was a violation of the
contract's requirement that all new personnel must receive forty hours of orientation and pre-
employment training before being assigned to a duty post. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any
type of on-the-job training (OJT). While OJT is not specifically mentioned in the contract, it is
common for new employees to receive training and some type of review by supervisor or senior
employee to ensure they understand how to apply any training they have received.

The Assessment Team questioned ESMOR Facility Administrator Willard Stovall regarding
how many on-duty personnel had not received the appropriate training. Mr. Stovall admitted that
he currently had four persons performing security duties who had not received the required training.
Mr. Stovall said he was expecting more new hires and desired to present the training to a single
group.

A certain level of interpersonal skills are essential for anyone dealing intimately both with
a detained population and the public. The attitude of many ESMOR personnel towards visitors,
attorneys, and the Assessment Team brought into question the effectiveness of their training in this
area. An incident took place prior to June 18 that is an example of the prevailing lack of
interpersonal skills among many ESMOR guards. The incident involved local Elizabeth City
Councilman, Mr. Orlando Edreira, who was requested by INS to meet with the Assessment Team
at the ESMOR facility. It was clearly explained to the ESMOR guard standing post in the reception
area that Councilman Edreira would be coming to meet with INS officials. Still, when the
Councilman arrived, the guard refused him access. Councilman Edreira had presented the guard
with unquestionable proof of his identity, i.e., valid city credentials, including a badge. He clearly
stated his business, and that he was there by invitation of INS. The guard, having denied the
Councilman entry, did not then take the customary and appropriate action of notifying INS that a city
official was in the reception area. As a result of the guard's inexplicable intransigence the INS
Assessment Team was unaware of the Councilman's arrival. The guard's actions created an
unnecessary embarrassment for the Service, and served to anger and alienate a city official whose
good offices are of importance in securing INS interests in the community.

ESMOR management should reasonably have been able to deduce, by the number of
complaints received from visiting attorneys and the general public, that there were serious problems
in the area of staff to detainee and staff to public relations. ESMOR should have addressed this
through remedial training.

It is the finding of the Assessment Team that ESMOR did not comply with the standards of
training as outline in subsection three of the contract in that, the contractor is required to provide a
minimum of forty hours of INS approved training prior to assigning an employee to any post. As
indicated above, ESMOR failed to do so in numerous cases. Additionally, ESMOR is required to
provide a total of 160 hours of total training during the first year. ESMOR did not have sufficient

Page 19 July 20, 1995

CF 02343

c.

personnel resources to accomplish the required training without adversely affecting its ability to
properly man posts within the facility.

Recommendations:

a. ESMOR should be required to submit proof of a comprehensive training plan which
ensures that all ESMOR personnel will receive the appropriate amount of training
and orientation in a timely manner.

b. ESMOR should be required to submit a monthly report detailing the amount of
training, type of training provided, and names of employees receiving the training.

The INS COTR must more closely monitor the ESMOR training program and
records to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the information provided by
ESMOR.

JL Food Serving

Food Service is provided via a full service food preparation area located on-site. Food
service responsibilities are sub-contracted by ESMOR to Aramark Food Service Corporation
Detainees are provide three meals each day at regular intervals. A total average caloric intake of
3300 calories per day is provided to the detainees. This is in excess of the contract requirement
The food is prepared on-site and delivered to the dormitories in an appropriate manner. Menus and
daily diet requirements are certified by a registered dietician, as required in the contract, to ensure
that daily nutation requirements are met. Additional commissary food items are available for a
nominal charge.

The Assessment Team examined food preparation and storage, including verifying that
proper temperatures were maintained. Food related implements, equipment, and machinery were
examined (including partial disassembly) to check for cleanliness. The Team found all physical
components of food preparation, service, storage, and disposal to be adequate or more than adequate.

There were numerous detainee complaints about the food. Primarily, the complaints centered
around the actual preparation, variety, and taste of the food. Some detainees complained the food
was too spicy and caused stomach aches. They also complained that when they advised ESMOR
personnel and management of this, ESMOR responded by providing more food but did not address
the preparation and taste issues.

The Assessment Team found no spoiled food or canned food with expiration dates exceeded
The Assessment Team determined that ESMOR was unresponsive to the detainees request to change
the menu or the manner in which the food was prepared. The detainees often responded by refusing

Page 20 July 20, 1995

CF 02344

to eat the meal and throwing it away. With the number of complaints generated during the
assessment, ESMOR management should have addressed this issue in a more aggressive manner.
However, it is noted that most on-duty ESMOR staffand many on-site INS staff availed themselves,
for a modest charge, of the opportunity to eat at the facility. They ate exactly the same food as the
detainees. The Assessment Team sampled a meal at the facility and found the food palatable and
acceptable.

JRecommendatinw

a. ESMOR and INS should create a system to more closely monitor detainee
complaints about food, determine if the complaints have merit, and provide the
detainees with specific responses.

£x Medical Care

At the request of INS RODDP three medical assessments of the facility were conducted
within the last five months. RODDP was concerned that the facility was making excessive medical
referrals to emergency rooms and other outside medical services.

Two assessments were conducted in February. One by a team from the INS Health Services
Division (HSD) administered by the Public Heath Service (PHS). The other by Doctor W. Cheung,
PHS Clinical Director, Varick Street Service Processing Center Medical Clinic. In May, Doctor
Cheung also conducted a follow-up assessment. The following are the findings of those
assessments.

Findings of February Assessment by HSD Team:

1 . Inappropriate referrals for off-site medical care of cases that could and should have
been treated in the facility's clinic. Under the contract, off-site medical care expenses
are chargeable to INS not ESMOR.

2. Lack of documentation in the health care record with regard to treatment rendered
and necessity of off-site referrals.

3 . Referrals to dental without documented assessment and need for referral.

4. PPD screening (Purified Protein Derivative-the standard medical test to screen for
tuberculosis) for tuberculosis was not consistent and some detainees were not
properly screened.

Page 21 July 20, 1995

CF 02345

5. Health appraisals were not being carried out on all detainees within 14 days as
required by the contract. (In one case a detainee had not received a medical screening
until four months after he was booked into the facility)

6. The progress notes in all cases were that of an RN. The notes indicated the condition
of the detainee, but contained no objective information, assessment, or treatment
plan. No follow-up appointments were noted in the record.

7. Follow-up with regard to off-site care was not documented except in one or two
instances. This documentation was that of an RN indicating that the Designated
Health Authority had reviewed the findings.

8. Follow up with regard to laboratory work, x-rays, on-site dental work or serious
medical conditions was not documented.

9. While off-site and laboratory referrals were appropriate in some instances (e.g., eye
problems, enlarged testicles, blood in stool), the majority of records contain no
documentation supporting the referral for off-site care.

Findings of February Assessment by Doctor Cheung:

1 . The facility had 1 2-hours-per- week physician services from a single doctor, and staff
of seven nurses (three full-time and four, part-time) for approximately 300 detainees.

2. The physician's time was apportioned to provide physical examinations for new
arrivals, with any unused time devoted to sick calls. (These levels of service meet
or exceed the contract requirements)

3. The facility did not conduct regular daily sick call sessions or periodic follow-up
sessions.

4. All off-site medical referrals were done by MD's orders, or at the discretion of RNs
and/or ESMOR guards.

5. 70 percent of off-site referrals were not appropriate and should have been treated in
the facility's clinic.

6. Sick call slips were stapled to the left flap of each medical chart, and no
corresponding notes indicating the services rendered were seen in staff progress
notes.

7. There were blank spaces in between progress notes in the majority of the charts.

Page 22 July 20, 1995

CF 02346

8. All progress notes were written in non-soap format, ("soap" is a medical term of art
referring to a generally accepted standard method of medical record keeping. It is a
problem oriented way of medical charting - Subjective, Objective, Assessment, and
Plan)

Dr Cheung concluded: "In the absence of existing evidence that sick call sessions were
conducted daily and periodic follow up care was provided for any acute and chronic medical
conditions by the qualified health care providers, it seemed obvious that all the problems had to be
solved by sending them out to off-site medical facility."

Findings of May Assessment by Doctor Cheung:

1. A new physician came on board in March, and the physician work hours were
increased to 20 hours per week.

2. The frequency of off-site referrals was substantially reduced compared to those
referenced in the previous assessment.

3. There were overall marked improvements in medical record keeping and the
recording of health assessments.

4. The contents of the charts reflected the quality of care to be optimal and compatible
to that of community health care providers.

5. Although the format of medical record assembly was different from the INS-HSD's
guidelines, all medical records were kept in a well-managed sequential order.

A copy of each medical assessment report was provided to ESMOR, and INS requested
ESMOR to make appropriate changes to comply with the terms of the contract.

Findings of the INS Assessment Team:

As part of its overall review of ESMOR, the INS Assessment Team examined facility
medical services. Based upon findings by PHS and Dr. Cheung, the Team concluded that individual
medical evaluations of detainees who were seen during sick calls were timely and well done.
However, as stated by Dr. Cheung, sick call was not conducted on a daily basis nor were there
always necessary medical follow-ups as required under the terms of the contract.

The Team noted a conflict of findings between the PHS Assessment and that of Dr. Cheung.
While the PHS Assessment Team characterized sick call as excellent, Dr. Cheung noted a failure of
ESMOR to provide daily sick call and follow-up for detainees. In response to the Team's inquiry,

Page 23 July 20, 1995

CF 02347

PHS said the decision of the medical authority (Dr. Cheung) would take precedence over the finding
of the Medical Assessment Team with regard to the sufficiency of sick call.

Oversight of the medical operation was acceptable. When problems were suspected, Eastern
Region PHS, in coordination with HQPHS, provided for a professional and thorough review which
resulted in better health care service and ensured consistency within the parameters of the contract.

The Team found that many medically-related complaints were raised by the Office of
Congressman Menendez, Councilman Orlando Edreira, and various attorneys. There was also a
pattern by ESMOR of inappropriate use of off-site medical services. The following recommendation
is based on these findings.

Recommendations:

a. PHS should take over the functions of all medical services provided on-site.
Resources have been identified and such a move would be both cost effective and
prudent given the consequences should a detainee not receive appropriate care while
in Service custody.

IL Access to Counsel / EOTR / TNS

The Assessment Team was advised by attorneys that access to their clients was severely
hampered by the manner in which ESMOR enforced its visitation and telephone policies. The
Assessment Team consulted with INS COTR Uzzle and ESMOR Facility Administrator Stovall.
The Team also reviewed visitation logs and the detainee telephone system.

The Assessment Team found that there was a lack of consistency in ESMOR's administration
of attorney visits to their clients. Further, there was little effective communication between attorneys
and ESMOR and between attorneys and INS officers located at ESMOR. ESMOR changed the
visitation policy without reasonable notification to counsel. Attorneys did not feel welcome to visit
their clients. On two occasions, attorneys said, they were challenged without due cause by ESMOR
guards who threatened them with expulsion from the facility. ESMOR could not produce a written
policy reflecting the changes to attorney visitation. This led to confrontations between ESMOR and
attorneys. The occurrence of confrontations was authenticated by attorney Joyce Phipps and
ESMOR officials.

In some instances, attorneys were required to wait up to three hours to visit with clients. This
was primarily due to a limited amount of attorney visitation space (although the space met
contractual requirements) and a high number of consultations. The Team found ESMOR did not
make a sufficient effort to reconcile the problem with attorneys. ESMOR overlooked or ignored

Page 24 July 20, 1995

CF 02348

simple solutions to the problem such as asking attorneys to pre-schedule visits when possible, or
providing information about when the facility was least busy.

Access was further hindered by the method of telephone service. The contract did not require
that pro bono legal services be programmed into the system. Accordingly, detainees were hindered
in obtaining counsel via direct calls because pro bono services do not accept collect calls. This also
caused undue delays in their administrative hearings because Immigration Judges routinely granted
continuances to aliens who wanted to but had not obtained representation. ESMOR accepted the
recommendation of the Assessment Team without question, and these services were scheduled to
be activated by June 21.

Recommendations:

a. ESMOR should post in a convenient place the visitation policy and any subsequent
changes in policy.

b. Attorneys who regularly practice immigration law, along with free legal service
groups, should be notified by mail of any changes in the visitation policy. INS
should be able to provide lists of free legal service groups.

c. ESMOR should consider a method of scheduling a certain number of attorney visits.
This could be done on a mutually acceptable schedule.

L Physical Facility

Application of American Correctional Association (ACA) Standards:

The facility was designed by a recognized ACA certified architect to conform with the INS
solicitation requirements and ACA physical plant standards as described in the ACA's Third Edition,
Adult Local Detention Facility Standards.

Prompted by 27 escapes in the first four months of operation ESMOR modified all
dormitories. They also invested a significant amount of money in a motion detection alarm system
designed to detect intrusions into unauthorized areas. These two modifications helped reduce
escapes to one in the following six months. That single escape was related to a failure of ESMOR
personnel to follow policy by leaving a detainee outside the secure perimeter of the facility. This
was a violation of INS' explicit written directive.

Review of the facility by the Assessment Team discovered the following items which either
did not conform to the physical plant requirements of the contract, or to ACA standards referenced

Page 25 July 20, 1995

CF 02349

SSte^:™ C ° ntraCt PhySkal St3ndardS ' ° r ^ may be Sub J eCt t0 a le * al suf ^ncy

1 . At least two of the dormitories did not have sufficient access to natural light In
male dorrmtones a minimal number of skylights were present but were inadequate
The remainder of the dormitories had windows at a height of approximately 25 feet
t™t e £ ^ n ° si8nifi f art View to outside °*er than the sky. Several of the

wTertr r T & ^ " ^ ° f ** buildin S * is questionable

whether or not a sufficient amount of indirect lighting was available.

2. Under the terms of the contract, there is a requirement for access to natural light in
*e segregation area. A requirement for three skylights over this area was Jed n

T™* x° ^ Final ° ffer " ** Was °*&*y "view 3

by the Technical Rev ie w Team. There is no natural light in this area.

3 ' lan^l^f r< r ati0n m iS a PP roximatel y L520 square feet, as required. It
consists of a flat cement area with one basketball hoop and a volleyball net

aZZZ' ^ y aCtiVity ^ bC C ° ndUCted 3t a time due t0 the limited area
multinli ^ ,S k Sl f " nded bv walls approximately 30 feet high. There are

mult p e openings which allow in sunlight and fresh air. There is very little
circulatjon of fresh air due to the depth and design of the recreation area. Becau
of the high walls and limited area, it is often difficult for more than 20 to 25
defcunees to remain m the area without interfering with one another's activities. It is

SSStT^ " would meet the legal definition of - outd °-

4 ' nr^^ 8 WCre Pr ° Vided 5n ** SQ ^ion cells. The only furniture

present was a bed, a toilet, and a wash basin.

5 ' ° f ? 0rm i t0ries ' toilets were vi ^ble from some of the tables provided

for detainee meals and recreation. Both as a matter of privacv and of good taste
privacy panels should have been devised to correct this situation

6 ' 1?£7J? US ^ Were a PP^imately 36 inches high and

vSS f ICSS P nvacv ; han w *»* in the men's dormitories. Female shower! were
visible from the comdor and could be viewed from areas outside the female area.

mnHif 0thCr ^ ^ 3b0Ve ' facility was in 8 00d order ™ d the physical plant was in eood
condmon prior to the disturbance. Dormitories were designed in a mLer wnich p JvTd s for a

generally well designed and spacious allowing for easy travel and good general access The facilitv
was spread outinamanner which allows for excellent lines of signt ^

Page26 July 20, 1995

CF 02350

dormitory areas. There was no evidence of overcrowded conditions, as alleged in several media
reports.

Recommendations

a. ESMOR should be required to comply with the contract in adherence to ACA
standards.

b. INS' procedures to accept a facility for operation need to be strengthened.
h. Contract rniflplfrn^

Note: Within this section each violation cited is followed immediately by the corrective
actions taken and/ or recommendations.

On June 10, during the Assessment Team's review of the current contract, numerous
instances of noncompliance were noted. The ACBADM Contracting Officer for this contract was
requested to take immediate action on the following deficiencies. (Note: Other recommendations
noted elsewhere in this report, may also have contractual implications.)

1 . Subsection 2. Personnel - Item C.(5); page 1 7 of the contract

Violation: The contractor failed to report all violations or attempted violations of the
standard of conduct or any criminal activity to the COTR. It was found that ESMOR had withheld
information from the INS COTR. The failure to provide timely and accurate information misled INS

SSnp T ^fji 01 ^ 0115 ^ ° CCUrTing - ReferenCe incident re P° rts noted ^ ^

REPORTS and DETAINEE WELFARE sections of this report.

Recomme ndations:

a.

Both the Facility Administrator and the INS COTR have been advised of this
situation. It was recommended that the INS COTR institute daily requests about all
incidents between detainees and guards and that the Facility Administrator report any
incidents or allegations of misconduct to the INS COTR in a timely manner as
outlined under the terms of the contract.

2. Subsection 5. Physical Plant - Item D.3.(b)(3); page 3 1 of the contract

Violation: Detainees assigned to the administrative segregation unit did not have continuous
access to natural light.

Page 27 July 20, 1995

CF 02351

Recommentlaf^-

*' S^SmSL*? V? skyligh,s be insa,lcd in "* «« *■

segregation unit. No skylights have been installed The ArnAm/ r .
Office needs ,o pursue the addition of the skylight

3- Subsecuon 7. Sanitation and Hygienic Living Conditions - .ten, F; pa g e 38 of the contract

one char^eSotog^ek 8 SwIT^ IT"? ^ «"»«»'' «* only '

detainee/oaen^^^^^

««£S£S O^SeS a^ rre^T ' ^ - — * -
4. Subsection 7: Sanitation and Hygienic Living Conditions - Item L; page 38 of the contract

available due lo ZSL w^Tonte "''^ Cl ° ,UnS Was
underwear per week Inaddiuon if™!,^ ,2 T* 86 ' 0nly reCeivi ° 8 one clea ° P air »f
-n^eunde^

ACB^C^ctgO^Xl^^

5. Subsection 10. Security and Control - Item D.(5); page 47 of the contact

^ces, ^'Xr^SSrr -eationfreugL
g- and

Page28 July 20, 1995

CF 02352

Recommendations:

a. The INS COTR needs to work with the Facility Administrator to ensure a single
logbook which contains at least a minimum of the following information is kept
within the control area and is available to the INS COTR or other reviewing INS
Officer upon demand: (1) the personnel on duty; (2) detainee counts and security
checks; (3) shift activities; and (4) any incidents, assaults, emergencies, or similar
situations.

b. ESMOR must ensure a more appropriate method of maintaining logbooks which
allow for Central Control to receive information at a single location regarding all
significant incidents.

6. Subsection 1 1 . Supervision of detainees - Item B; page 50 of the contract

Violation: Detainees are not permitted to supervise, control, or exercise any authority over
other detainees. ESMOR has created a detainee committee to represent detainee grievances. Both
the INS and ESMOR were attending these sessions. The Assessment Team review indicated that
only a portion of detainee grievances were being heard and the detainees, for the most part, felt that
the grievances in question were not always representative of the majority. Moreover, non-
participating detainees expressed the belief that those detainees on the committee were "special" and
"privileged", and were representing only "their own [interests]." This type of committee also places
some detainees in a position of constructive authority and power which can be exerted over the rest
of the population.

Recommendations:

a. The INS COTR will place a grievance box in each dormitory for the sole use of
detainees. Detainees will be able to provide, directly to the INS, complaints,
allegations, or other information which previously has not been provided by the
contractor. The INS representative should no longer participate in the meetings
between ESMOR and the detainees. It is the strong recommendation of the
Assessment Team that this practice cease and emphasis be placed on instituting a
two-way grievance system under which the INS would acknowledge receipt of
complaints and indicate that they are being looked into. Such a system would
facilitate the process of documenting the contractor's follow-up on complaints in a
written form; provision being made for illiterate and/or non-English speaking
detainees to present their complaints.

Page 29 July 20, 1995

CF 02353

7. Subsection 1 1 . Supervision of Detainees - Item E; page 50 of the contract

Violation: Assigned duty posts were abandoned or left unmanned by ESMOR employees
in order to take breaks or accomplish other tasks. A shortage of personnel necessitated dorm guards
leaving their posts to accommodate detainee phone calls outside the dormitory area. On the second
day of the assessment, nine of the 17 guards assigned to work in the facility were observed
simultaneously taking breaks outside. On a separate occasion the Acting Officer in Charge, Earline
Boyer noted a female guard leaving her assigned post. This female guard was the only guard
working what was supposed to be a two-guard post. When this guard left her post, unsecured female
detainees were observed unsupervised in several areas. A review of staffing for the facility indicates
personnel shortages were a daily occurrence. A preliminary review by RODDP at the request of the
Assessment Team indicated that an average of six, and as many as eight, guards were being required
to work double shifts each day. s'^uucu

Recommendations;

a. The COTR needs to monitor daily personnel assignments more closely.

b. The use of staff on double shifts is a hazardous practice and should be limited under
the terms of the contract to those instances approved by the COTR for emergent
circumstances..

c. Guards should not be allowed to work more than four hours beyond the normal eight-
hour tour of duty.

d. When it becomes apparent that inadequate personnel are available to ensure
appropriate coverage, the COTRs should request that RODDP consider a decrease
m the daily population until ESMOR can provide evidence of compliance and a
continued ability to provide personnel for each post.

e. The contract fails to define "tour of duty" or address the limits of the tours A
contract modification should be initiated to correct this deficient

8. Subsection 12. Detainee Rights, Rules, Discipline, and Privileges - Item E; page 52 of the
contract

Allegations: There have been repeated claims of assaults on detainees by ESMOR guards
as wel as numerous claims of harassment, and/or verbal abuse. The allegations have been made by
several attorneys, and some ESMOR guards who requested not to be identified. Allegations ranged
from continued verbal abuse by some of the ESMOR personnel, to accounts of physical abuse. The
Assessment Team, interviewed numerous persons regarding these allegations. The Team had the

Page 30 July 20, 1995

CF 02354

Team finds the overall teXonv^n ^ "** ** confidential informants. The

allegations are toTthT^lilf f T* 10 Wammt ligation. If the

a. Increase INS oversight of the contract to 24 hours a day, seven days a week to
ensure proper performance and conduct of ESMOR staff

b. Place grievance boxes in each dormitory for aliens to provide information and
complaints directly to the COTR or his designee. miormation and

delafee rig^ t0 ^ ^ t0 of ^ violation of

9 ' te^nST Adm ' SSi0n ' 0rien,a,i0n ' »* Pro ^ - 1- Hi page 53 of

ESMOR it was discovert that tk» «i ■ * scneauiea nights. When an inquiry was made to
their fimd Z valuX ^SMnlT "7 ^ t0 ^ departing flightS ^ *«* receiv ed

Page31 July 20, 1995

CF 02355

RecommendaftQ m;

a ' ff^f Pr ° Vide Ughter C ° ntr0ls over Ae Processing, storage and accounting
b. Any discrepancies in these records must be reconciled prior ,o their day of departure.

c lacss ^ n rx adopt w •» — -

10 ' ftetmL 8 , M0 ° etMy Adj ~ &r ***** Perf — " "» F.8.b..; page 66 of

"adepursuanttodeterntil^nXtoJ: L 2^1^177"^"

posts manned by guards who are sleeping or imoxiS- 2 ' Para8raph H d '

ESMQR^ZTS: SXt^ o— se™dT d ^ F A — ™»
functions. Also, as stated earlier an 7 ™ g ^"P"^ to perform other

staffed by personnel " T? " eigl " ^ eaCh Wre

created undue hardships on sle of ft „t 1 n TT '" Wh ' Ch su P ervisOTS ^Sned overtime
supervisors refused w rS Lr She , n ^ Said ** on at least wo

■volunteered to stay- an addWonalshff. TOU, 1 '° ' he female "»'« *e

male guards, until l^^^^^J^T^ * ^ ^ * -
ReconuufifHffff rrriT .

b- The COTR needs to immediately put the contractor on notice of any such violations

Page32 ■ July 20, 1995

CF 02356

.nelson m the solicitation package. The Regional Procurement L Detent offices ex? essS
to Headquarters, numerous concerns about the language and scope of le S O W md ^v
recommended specific changes. Headquarters was reluctant to alter aSy l4uage W the SOW
was to be a standard used at all INS detention locations. 8

The SOW developed was based on a performance type of specification rather than a more
rigid design type of specification. The SOW describes the services that are SSX^LH
meet the Government's requirements. In determining compliance issues, HSSS
demonstrate that they (the contractor) meet the minimal levels. If the c^tra^S^S^
these levels they should be meeting the Government's acceptable level of Sv ce ThtTvn of
specification works well for routine sorts of tasks. It is not J^^^^d^l2S o
Government mvolvement and direction necessary to assure the INS' m*£Z%^£

SSKSI^fl^ ^ Perf0mianCe of ^cdfic^^S^S

discretion in the hands of the contractor. The contractor determines how best to carry out the

required serves. For example, the government does not mandate the number o ^^ecunWsonrt!
spedfic E£ ^ dirCCt SUPerViSi ° n and °P erational Actions for that

through!^ ^iencies w ere present

f ... pcnoa \ in general, fcbMOR lacked essential consistency in its practices and
application of policies governing the operation of the facility. Furthermore KMoES^o
prov.de vital information to the INS hindered the overall operation oTZ facUity The course of

which M0R ^ " ^ Unf ° rtUnate P0Si '° n ° f h ™S <° « Pond^oiS
Z" fW ? ,nmany mstances > ^ had no prior knowledge. The Team found that
ESMOR evidenced a continuing cycle of contract violations, failure to identify and c^Ste
^general fa„ure to fellow sound management practices Management of th^^S

m Assessment of INS o pP r a *j » ns Re | afpH tn y gjunp

The Assessment Team reviewed INS' operations related to ESMOR in the following

page

areas:

A. The Newark District

B. Juvenile Detention

C. ACBSEC - Security Clearances

34
40
42

Page 33

July 20, 1995

CF 02357

D. Community Relations 42

E. RODDP / ACBADM 44

F. The Hearing Process 44
G Newark Asylum Pre-screening Program (APSO) 54

nict^w 6 AsSe f sment Team initiallv set out to review the oversight of ESMOR by the Newark

OTR ■^SSSr^ C ° nCem ^ ° VerSight ° f ±e C ° ntraCt0r ' interaction the I^S

made byte D S ^ * ^ ^ » whkh SOme ™* were

As a result of the disturbance on June 18, the review was expanded to also include an

Philadebhla^tlf e ^° n its [ evieW ° f fi,es transfared from Newark/ESMOR to the

rfe ^ T f Se 6163 rekte t0 ^ aliens wh0 were detail * d at ESMOR at the time of
tt PH^Th' WCre latCr tWBfenBd int ° ^ PhiIade »PWa District. The report of findings fom
the Philadelphia file review will, upon its completion, become an addendum to this report

n^nnn"?! *f°T? ^""'"i 011 was **«nbled through site visits, interviews of INS and ESMOR
personnel and with detainees, review of memoranda, and discussion of problems and issues the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), ESMOR management, and the Newark j££

A* The Newar k Distrirt
INS Staffing at the Facility:

At *e time of the assessment the Newark Detention and Deportation Branch at the ESMOR
facility was staffed by three Detention Enforcement Officers (DEOXthree D^S^S^Z

Sl^l^r h 6 ^ 00 ASSiStantS - ° nC Sup — 0r > Won Off'e who

SScS?Sto roS^"? tw *° per 7 0ry Detemion Deportation officers <« the

[OIC] who also functioned as a COTR, the other a Supervisor of Detention
Operations.) The fac.hty has current vacancies for one Deportation Assistant one Supe^orv
Detention and Deportation Officer. Of the staff described here only the CO^^^S
aut onty of the facility. Other staff performed solely INS dutie'ela* l Il^ZXl
^^^s™*™™ f ° r d ~ ™ ** -el documLtt

Prior to the opening of the Elizabeth facility, the Newark District was allocated seven DEO
posmons, all of whom worked out of the district office. The ESMOR contract prov idelthalcon^

Page 34

July 20, 1995

CF 02358

guards perform most alien transport between the facility and JFKIA and NEWIA. When the facility
opened, Newark District was allocated an additional three DEO positions to perform airport- rdafcd
alien transport duties not assigned under the contract to ESMOR guards, e g., criminTl exclustn
cases destined for local jails. An INS office for DEOs was included in the facility s design

The original staffing structure adopted by then District Director Tillman did not allow for
close oversight of this multimillion dollar contract. The COTR duties at this location Ire far too
TZTftH ^ T T"* t0 bC C ° mblned ^ 0IC duties ^ociated with the management of
NEWIA are ZTf " f ^ ^ "~ eXclusion cases ^ICIA and

Sk) m C ° Unty JailS ^ Ae PhiIadel P hia District with venue remaining in

A history of extensive INS staffing changes at the facility, adversely affected the District',

P^^oSf?"- A " ° r 3b n Ut ^ 13 ' ° ffiCer R ~ detail ^ d *™ ^ OlSSX
position to that of Ac ,ng Assistant District Director for Investigations. Simultaneously, Supervisory

Special Agent (SSA) Alan Freiss was reassigned from his duties as the Deputy AsS2

Director for Investigations to the position of Acting OIG at the ESMOR facility. NornTanuS

to h Z«Z POrtatl ° n ° m 7' ^ th6n 3SSigned * e duti6S ° f C0TR for *e facility in addufon
I J fu m ^T 1S1 ° n dUtieS " This Staffin g chan 8 e more cl °sely resembled original plans
submitted by RODDP and HQDDP for INS management staffing of the facility. P

This new focus on role of the COTR had the effect of promptly uncovering questionable

^££S^J5 R J" 31 dirCCtly affCCted ^ "** - d -11-being of"nee^
ESMOR s response to Officer Uzzle's oversight and continuous flow of corrective action requests
was to ask INS management to remove him from his position. q

onlv m°T^ Wt 24 ' U ? 1 ^ aS ^ I r ed ° f WS su P ervisor y responsibility and directed to perform
ImT^Tw T V 11 ■ EarUne B ° yer ' SuperviSOr * Deportation Officer was reassigned
?f T £° P ° Slt,0n ° f (Acting) 0IC at ESMOR - SA Freiss was returned to his

to~iilo^ 7!^ ° f ? ffiCCr B ° yer Pr ° Vided f ° r 3 SCCOnd Contract ^ Officer
to assist with monitoring of the facility and INS functions.

Twenty-four-hour-per-day oversight of a contract detention facility by an on-site COTR or
other accountable INS staff, is not the current INS policy nationally for these type of conlacts

SSM" ^ t0 ^ iniUal «** ASS£SSment Te ^' the New - k DistfcTbegaii

^^S^T a T °r t0 ; ^ faCUity interi ° r - 7116 results of this d~fcioo wle
exce lent Detainees complaints dropped, and those who were interviewed by the Assessment Team

z^Tr^fr Tbal "f phy t* abuse subsided - ™ e ~ ° f ™ ~iS

as a deterrent to abuse and was welcomed by most of the detainees.

• . I h !J ean ! conclude d * at ^ee changes in INS leadership over the course of a ninety day
period contributed to oversight problems. During these personnel changes, ESMOR distanced itseff

p age 35 July 20, 1995

CF 02359

from INS oversight and did not communicate information concerning the operation of the facility

I T ^ ° f b> ' differem ^ C0TRs allowedESMOR to make o^u'n .

changes, m some cases contrary to the contract, which were detrimental to INS' interest

^ fecUhy iHty St3ffing Plan Sh ° Uld ^ m ° dified t0 meCt CUirent md foture needs at this

b ' toZT£ T li ° n SD ° Sh ° Uld bC C ° nVerted t0 SDD0 13 with responsibility
tor both detention and deportation functions.

c The position of SDDO (GS-12) should be converted to a Chief of Detention
Options (GS-12) and converted from ,801 series to 1802^(No dSS
Officers are supervised by this position). F"«*u°n

d ' FSMOPf in r mi0n u° f ^ NeW3rk District t0 continue usin S District DEOs at the

devoted tf '' ? Sh ° Uld ^ det£nnined h ° W mUCh 0f their < ime is — ntlv being

convlrtJ f "'^ CaSCS rem ° Va,S «* m ap P r °P" ate number of positioJ
converted from appropriated account expenses to user fee expenses.

weekta^ PreSenCC Sh ° Uld bS reqUired ^ thC faCiUt> ' ° n 3 24 h0Ur " sev en-da>-a-

f ' DFO<;T^ end H ati0n J e ^ S im P ,emented b >- authorizing user fee DEOs. then those
DEOs ass gned to the District should be returned to those functions for which thev
were originally allotted. "«.nine\

Facility Oversight - The INS Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR)

of the FSMOrIT l ° ASSeSSmem Team that seri °us golems regardine the INS oversi-ht
COTR M h , p ^ Pn0r 10 tHe lemp ° rar > de P anure of 0ffic « in Charge (OIC, and Hr

COTR Michael Rozos to Newark District Investigations Branch, where he was assigned L Act n,
Assistant District D rector for Investigations. However, furtner erosion of Se operaln S

Prior to April 24, when Officer Uzzle became full-time COTR, Mr. Willard Stovall Facilitv
Administrator told Officer Uzzle that changes in ESMOR p^KC^v^^I^l
verbally with little or no follow-up at the District or Regional levels. This tvp of^ pract ce ° f
permitted, would be disadvantageous to the INS becauL no written rccoXl^^

Pa ? e36 July 20. 1995

CF 02360

ton^^chai^ mpohcy, procedures, or practices in the facility. Officer Uzzle stated to the
Team that he informed Mr. Stovall verbally and by memorandum that such a practice is unacceptable

^^? ta ?t PrCVi0US INS C ° TR ' Mich3el R ° 20S ^ questioned conceCg
l S, ° Va11 S rnrv u ^ ^ 3greed t0 Verbal, y- Accordi "g * Officer Rozos

when he was COTR all changes were documented and maintained in accordance with the contract!

While the communication between INS and ESMOR remained unsatisfactory, Officer Uzzle

cZ£r t t0 iT fy TT Pr0b ! CI f ESM ° R ' S P«*™"* and relay this information to the
Contractmg Officer whc .then took the appropriate action. Specific problems noted were(l) a back-
log of medical bills wh,ch had not been submitted to Region for pavment; (2) unauthorized
disclosure by the Facility Administrator concerning detainee medical issues he was neither qualified
nor aumonzedto prov.de: (3) ESMOR guards providing legal advice to detainees: (4) docLented
funds and valuable d.screpanc.es within the facility; (5) insufficient property safeguards; and (6)
unanswered correspondence. J

On May 22. Officer Boyer joined the INS ESMOR staff as Acting OIC and Second COTR.

frn m PCuoffT" 1 Te3m f ° Und th3t after the departure of 0fflcer Rozos difficulties arisins
from ESMOR s failure to report problems to the COTRs were exacerbated by the COTRs' lack of

tothl krt ° pera J' 0nal e *P erience ^ a detention sening. Such experience is an important adjunct
to the ability to effecuvely monitor a contract detention facility. Although both Officer Uzzle and
Officer Boyer are exemplary Officers, and had attended and successfully completed the requisite
tnuning for their posmons. they lacked the depth of experience in the detention field to enable them
to independently .dennfy many problems within the facility. There is no training mechanism
available wnhm INS other than on-the-job which could have provided them with the knowledae and
understandmg needed to monitor the contract in a fully comprehensive manner.

Deportation Docket / Removals / Statistics:

j i. , * lhe ^ °f the distur bance. the Branch handled an average of 430 detained cases on their
docket. Th,s mcluded an average of 300 detained cases at ESMOR and 1 30 cases detained at Lehich
County Jail m Pennsylvania b

con,™!! 16 Phi |. adelphia Di 5? ct has been tasked by the Eastern Region with completing a
comprehens.ve file review of detainees who were detained at ESMOR. On June 7 the Regional
Director instructed the Newark District Director to complete and maintain statistics with regaldto
tte detention and removal of aliens interdicted by JFK1A and NEWIA. An integral part of these

JJS^^Jc^ "* Valid3tl0n ° f ^ ^ nUmbCr ° f ad ™ r ~ for

The Team found evidence of a steady increase, during the last five months, in the removal
rate for exclus.on cases detained at ESMOR. This indicated that EOIR, INS' Trial Attorneys, and

Page 37 Julv 20. 1995

CF 02361

the Deportation Division were beginning to work in a more coordinated manner as the facility's
"growing pains" subsided. The Newark District provided to the Assessment Team documentation
showing a total of 350 removals (exclusions or deports) during the period August 3 1994 (when the
facility opened) to June 18, 1995 (the date of the disturbance). In addition, 35 stowawav cases and
87 withdrawal cases were also completed (removed) from the ESMOR facility in the same period.

The scheduling of EOIR hearings remained problematic during the Assessment Team's visit.
One day there were three Immigration Judges hearing cases in both courtrooms and a conference
room. The following day, a total of only three hearings were scheduled.

Of great concern to the Team was the inability of the Service to remove an alien who desired
to withdraw from proceedings and simply return home. Aliens under exclusion proceedings would
often have to wait up to four weeks after a written request to withdraw from proceedings This
exceeded the national average by three weeks, and was of course reflected in a higher averaee length
of stay. s

Detention Decisions and Coordination:

The manner in which some District custody decisions were made, regarding where detainees
would be located, caused concern to the Assessment Team. There were complaints that aliens still
under proceedings, with local attorney representation, were being transferred to Lehieh County Jail
which is about one and one half hours away and located in the Philadelphia District At the same
SI 6 ;™ a, i eeS WUh "° scheduled ^coming court dates and pending appeals were being held at
ESMOR. There was a lack of consistency by the Newark Deportation Staff in decidin" where
detainees would be placed, this resulted in unnecessary movement of detainees.

Coordination of detainee movements between Newark and Philadelphia Districts was
problematic. For example, the Assessment Team observed a detainee case terminated bv the
Immigration Judge solely because the detainee was late for court. The detainee had not "been
transported by INS to the facility until the date of the hearing. A Trial Attomev assigned to the
facility told the Assessment Team that this was not the first time such a termination had occurred.

In addition to the review by the Assessment Team, the Eastern Regional Director has
ordered a complete case file review of all detained cases assigned to ESMOR. The Assessment
Team mil be provided with the results of this project and an addendum to this report will be
torwarded upon receipt and review.

Relations with Attorneys:

Complaints from some attorneys concerning their lack of access to their clients prior to court
appearances went largely unanswered by both INS and ESMOR. In meetings with attorneys the
Assessment Team was presented with three unanswered letters to the District Office, as examples

Page 38 July 20.1995

CF 02362

of what attorneys indicated was the District's lack of response to their grievances. One letter was
a request for Intervention in alleged abuses by ESMOR personnel of the attorney's detained

Attorneys also expressed frustration and exasperation over the amount of time they consumed
in attempts to merely locate their clients, and in dealing with a constant barrage of detainee
complaints concerning their treatment while in ESMOR. Attorneys claimed there was little
communication or assistance offered by INS personnel pertaining to their concerns.

The Assessment Team noted that the Newark District did meet with attorneys concerning the
formation of a pro bono group. The group requested at that time to provide "know your rights
presentations to aliens detained at the ESMOR facility. This request was not worked out to the
sa isfaction of either the District or the pro bono group. The District complained that many of the
attorneys were not always forthright in their concerns with the INS and that the attorneys did not
respond to request from the INS to provide at least an outline of dialogue they wished to discuss
A second meeting was held at the district office on June 22 and was attended bv various attorneys'
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), and District personnel in an attempt to
establish a pro bono program within the district.

The district reported to the Team that in a majority of case inquiries by the various attorneys
m&pro bono groups representing aliens, the inquiries were requests focused on obtainine the release
ot the detainee rather than di scussing the merits of the case.

Oversight by the Administrative Center and Regional Office (RODDP):

Oversight at the Regional level, by both ACBADM and RODDP. was made more difficult
by a lack m efficacious communication with the District. Both Regional entities frequently found
themselves responding to issues that came to their attention from the local news media and other

JS™ S T e \^! e C ^ 0nStant ChaliengC ° f res P° ndin S 10 issu « which should have come from
ESMOR through the District, denied Region the ability to undertake unhurried unpublicized
investigations, and hindered their ability to deal with each issue in a completely objective manner

Recommendntmn**

a. All ESMOR's Post Orders, Policies, and Procedures should be further re-reviewed
and approved by RODDP and HQDDP concurrently within 30 days of the release of
this report.

b - COTRs should receive some practical training by working in an existing contract
tacility before being assigned to a new facility.

Pa § e?9 July 20. 1995

CF 02363

c. The District needs to work harder to improve attorney and community relations.

& Juvenile Detention
INS* Juvenile Detention Policy:

re^din^H?^' ^ ,ations ' ™ e 8 ' section 2 ^-24 contains INS' rules and regulations

S2SSht™^5^ r ° fjUVeiuleS - ™ e re 8 ulations d <*ne a juvenile as an alien under

n TqqI t * ^ y C ™ Cemm * ** detention of juveniles is contained in the December

ni ent !. tl , ed Nati ° nal P ° licy ^ding Detention and Release of

SSST n- Cn M n° rS - fr0m thCn Commissioner Gene McNary to Regional Operations
Liaison Officers, District Directors, And Chief Patrol Agents.

h.IH K v ^r a l° na ! POliC k m cT 0randUm dirCCtS that 311 aIien minors awaiti "g Processine mav be
«f uch 7 T m ^ detC r n fadlitieS h3Ving SCparate ^ommodatbns for juveniles or.
if such accommodations are unavailable, in suitable state or county juvenile detention facilities It

l^-cT u° t'u min ° r ma> ' b£ hdd in 3 detention facilit >'- Aether a " INS facility or

oteTZ'iT* ° UrS - UnleSS th£ 3lien min ° r is Charged or convicted of a c ™inal offense

other than entry without inspection, is adjudicated a delinquent, has engaged in violent or disruptive

^° r - ,S 30 e ! C3 P ee fr0m another fac *ty is an unrepresented Salvador or cannot be moved
for other extraordinary or compelling reasons.

The ESMOR Detainees:

As a result of the ESMOR disturbance on June 1 8, all of the aliens detained there were

XZtL nT 6 " 'I f " lhC Philadel P hia Dist "«- When the detainees arrived in the
Philadelphia DistncL eight of them claimed to be juveniles. Detention and Deportation Branch
personnel interviewed each of the eight, and reviewed the related Alien Files.

During interviews, two of the aliens quickly admitted to being over 1 8 vears of age Of the
s.x remammg. Philadelphia Officers believed one was a juvenile and transferred h^- to a iuven!
racinn He was later paroled to the custod> of United States Citizen relatives.

fnr fw f T aUCnS Wh ° C ° ntinUed 10 Cl3im t0 be juveniles durin S th * interview, were referred
for forensic dentistry examinations to determine their ages. The forensic test revealed one
md^dual-s estimated age to be at least 21 years. The other four were found to be in the "vkinhv
of 8 years or less/ These four were placed by the Philadelphia District at the Berks Youth C n r
10 ^ $P0 ?; Pe ™ S y ,vania - 0n Jul >- 3 »nd 5, the Philadelphia District paroled three of the four to the
cus^dy of United States Citizen relatives. Efforts are ongoing to contact relatives for the rema

Page 40 ■ July 20. 1995

CF 02364

The individual whom the forensic test revealed to be an estimated ap P of M i„c* n ,
claimed to be a 14 year old United States citi™ ~ an . estimat f age of at least 21 years.

determmed that he was an tmposter, using the valid passport of a 14 year old ciSeT
Newark's Response:

J 1 " Nev ™* Districts' response to the allegation that juveniles had been held at ESMOR
aeponauon orticer to make a determination of aee. However most A^\n^ *t pcx^d u • 1

ST^SST^ ^' ? " d r' nM U a min ° r - cements are'then made for ph e m „
the detainee and a determination of minoriu is made * W ° f

The Newark District stated that as these are exclusion cases. the»burden of proof • falls to the

X. ^ilddtj: i, ^ e8ation of n ns a minor «»■ '^SL*

umpire review is done again. If a document is submitted by the alien to suddou hU rW, m »„a
venficanon ,s needed, or the document appears counterfeit or Altered th /ocumen, „ " tn

The Assessment Team's Findings:

The Newark District's method of determining custody of juveniles has several lanse, I,
mistakenly placed a burden of proof on the alien to prove he was a \ L,ZT a i P
being a juvenile must be separated from -duta^l^

SET ?h ff ^ ° f fraUdU,ent d ° CU ~™ aliens detained at ESMOR 2 v w £ it fs u ear
when m the detention process an alien cla.med to be a juvenile

Recommei^fi^y

a.

The Newark ^District should be directed to closely adhere to both the regulations in

fuverl i ' ^ 1991 P ° Hcy memora ndum regarding the detention of
juvemles; placing particular emphasis on fact that the 72 hour limit for detention of
alien minors commences when INS assumes custody of the juveniles

Pa ? e41 July 20. 1995

CF 02365

Mr Stt ^^„'?!^T ,y ^ PerC£nt ° f ESM ° R Staff ' indudin ^ the Facilit >- Administrator
Mr. Stovall did not have the proper security clearances or waivers. ESMOR complained that the

E^Tms ^ T ™ 1 was r difficuh due to long back ^ ound i-v-^^^

b> the WS. The Assessment Team found ESMOR's complaint to lack credibHity as a principal
reuon for under-staffing. The background investigation requirement is clearly s^ed in £e3

forml " h IT ^ ^ mUSt bC Pr ° Vided ^ P**"* cle^r

T Cte u d ^ ° n dUty ° f ^ P erSon - Furmermore, it was
SSSTJ ^ ^ T Ver may be ° btained ' f0r P" 5005 ™> derogatory information in

JESSS^ y Wthm 30 ^ ^ ** PaP£rWOrk " Pr0pCr,y C ° m P leted ^ "d !n

rACBSFr^Vl E ? M ° R f dearanCe PaCketS P£nding a PP roval in the ™S Office of Security
(ACBSEC) at the .me of this investigation. 12 were improperly filled out. ACBSEC securitv

persorujelwereonginally detailed to the facility for one week w-hen me contract was aw Jed otr"
ESMOR personne , so as to avoid precisely this situation. The INS is not responsible for de^vs
caused by incomplete paperwork submitted by ESMOR. ESMOR has now hired a personne
specialist to assist with review and completion of the paperwork required bv the Office of S u"v

ijsisssr would also be abie to he,p esmor p— >~ ~ £

Recommendations:

a.

b.

Bu^no^o^nfr ^"rc 11 ' * ^ assessment of the Administrative Center
Burlmgton Office of Security and. if necessary, institute systemic improvements.

Remedial training or hands-on informational training should be provided to ESMOR
to ensure there .s no repetition of problems in properly utilizing the securitv
clearance system. -

JL Communit y Relatione

As related to the Assessment Team by Congressman Menendez and pro Wattorney
represents, effective community relations by the Newark District was sorelvfa eking Pro bono

S T fa !! ed t0 a ^°^y «P«d to serious problems within L ESMOR

facility. Congressman Menendez and attorneys said they did not feel the District Directors
forthright m his response to their concerns and that their complaints were mostly un JswerX
ignored. Further, they complained that they were unable to schedule routine tour's oTZSy

Pa S e42 Julv 20. 1995

CF 02366

nrnvJH ASSeSSment ^ Warren Lewis, Newark District Director Mr Lewis

Si^ScTS ^r^rt r mcted his staff to provide 311 ^

requested, which they did. A review of the documentation showed the District was workine

SSEJt T C V he :?\ SOnS ° f C ° mp,aintS highl ^ hted b * the Congressman aTanorne^
However, the Team found Imle evidence that the results of these efforts (or the fact that such efforts
were being taken) were being transmitted to the Congressman and the atL^STcSflSSS
was at tune, restricted in the type of response it could offer, based on directives from the EaSm
Region concerning responses to the media and issues which could result in litigation ne^rthelesT
much more could have been done to directly reassure and respond to concerned

2£ TdZT^Z 7 Ut *" COmmUnity W " n0t tdd ° f U - * e Assessment™ s

In" ^^eTSS ' t0Ur ° f ^ faCUity fW C ° n ~ MCnendeZ - ^

nra.nl Jt hC ^ ^ ^ ° iStrict ' partly via ^gnments of personnel within its own
organization, was attempting to gain better control of the problems within ESMOR The lack ed
approved appointments to key positions such as the Deputy District Director (DDD) and ^the loss o
his Assistant District Director for Detention and Deportation (ADDD) left N«i w th serious

? ho : gh **■ deficits were in iar§e pan com ~ ** Cztzz

01 competent employees placed in acting positions.

Based on the information provided to the Assessment Team, we conclude that the District
shou, d have taken a more proactive approach to community relations. The DisiTs^d^^
that^senous problems were developing and responded in a more meaningful manner to concerned

Recommendation r.-

c.

The Newark District should develop a better working relationship with the
Cor.gress.onal delegation, attorneys, the local community, and others who have a
vested interest in the manner for which INS conducts its business.

In support of recommendation "a" the District should form a Commune \\ orkm-

noTed P in C ^ P0 TH d °' individu ^ from ,NS ' ESM0 ^ ™* members of the entities'
noted in a . This group could meet monthly, or as needed, to ensure community
participation m issues of community interest.

The District should work whh ESMQR tQ prov . de ^.^
the facility for concerned parties in the community.

Pa ? e43 July 20. 1995

CF 02367

E* Eastern Region Detenti on and Deportation fl^ODDP) and

Administrative Center Bu rlington Administration (ACBADMt

Over the course of the contract, ACB ADM has maintained oversight of the contract and
intervened when necessary to ensure contract compliance. ACBADM had almost dailv contact with
the COTRs and ESMOR concerning problems brought to their attention by the Newark District
RODDP, the news media, and various other sources. Regional personnel were committed to
responding to complaints which increased weekly over the course of the contract.

ESMOR has generally complied with corrective action demands. These demands have
included such items as: (1 ) corrective action to prevent an almost continuous chain of 27 escapes
such as were experienced during the first four months of operation; (2) cessation of the use of leg
restraints during visitation: and (3) ESMOR's policy of charging detainees for lost items such as
spoons, clothing, cups, and other items. While ESMOR was generally responsive in makino
required corrective actions. INS could not always identify issues needing corrective action, because
ESMOR kept information from INS.

In March 1995 RODDP reduced the facility's population while it attempted to resolve
ccw™ secunty ' 0ff " SIte medical referral concerns, and other issues broueht to the attention of
ESMOR by Regional Contracting and Regional Detention and Deportation personnel. When it
became apparent that additional INS oversight was needed at the facility, a second COTR was added
to the contract. Officer Boyer was assigned to this COTR position. Throughout this period there
was no indication that ESMOR voluntarily provided any information to INS relatine to incidents
But they failed to inform the COTR of many problems which the Assessment Team later determined
had been occurring with gross regularity. It was apparent to the Assessment Team that ESMOR
management was not in full control of its mid-level supervisors or euards at the time of the
assessment.

Recommendations:

a. INS must ensure that ESMOR is providing accurate verifiable information.
Currently daih communication is made only to discus? an existing problem An
open line of communication needs to be maintained on a daily basis instead of
weekly, whether or not a current problem exists. A full-time INS presence is needed
at this site.

The Hearing Process

The Assessment Team reviewed documents and statistics provided bv INS and the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) concerning detainee hearings and length of stay in detention
The team also participated in interviews with INS and ESMOR personnel. EOIR interviewed its

Page 44 Julv 20, 1995

CF 02368

personnel, including some Immigration Judges, and met with INS officials and members of the
Assessment Team to present their views. The Assessment Team has attempted to develop Though

facility and the causes of delay , n that process. Nevertheless, this report does not address some areas

Umf wTr?H Cm bCtWeen *f A J SeSSment Team - d E0IR - u,d *» * resolvedTa sTon
timeframe. For this reason, and because the INS and EOIR are independent agencies the

ex™! mTEofR 8 T t " d r°^ end V hat 3 C ° 0peratiVe rCVieW Sh0uld E SSdt
examine the INS-EOIR relationship, to identify and resolve problem areas.

Background:

nrocessm* Zl TZ ' 1 rat '^ faring process at the ESMOR facility resulted in lengthv

relvTV T ! nded Pe " 0dS ° f detenti0n - As a result > detenti °" costs were high the
removal rate was lower than expected, and INS enforcement goals were compromised All three

^™ORT,T tS - ^ ESM ° R - ^ E ° IR COmributed t0 this P roblem ™ NS contc
with ESMOR failed to include necessary provisions to ensure an efficient hearing process These

ontract defects could have been avoided if the INS had involved EOIR more close! i dnSingS
c^ D th J e j COntraCt P rov,slons - 10 include those pertinent to the hearing process At the sa^e
nme. EOIR did not fully staff the ESMOR facility with judges and clerk, S Office of*

relsT ^hTmlTa? n b b,e H ^ ^ att0rne >' S ™* ^ ^ sam

reason. This ma> haxe been due m pan to a late decision by INS to hear all New York user-fee

cases, including persons detained in other locations, at the ESMOR facility.

As a result of these planning deficiencies, the local INS. EOIR. and ESMOR oneration.
personne were placed in a difficult position from the inception of facilitv operations UnTer th
strain of these pressures, local personnel became involved in disputes over' operation" mauers and
fa led. m some respects, to maintain a professional working relationship. ESMOR failed to ensure
that detamees were presented in court in a timely and efficient manner ESMOR also failed for a
substan ,al penod of t.me. to fully cooperate with the INS and EOIR in establishinfa hearino
schedule that would meet the needs of all involved parties. This is in direct contra "I ESMOR

^^^e^^™ ashi ^ ;: here dose and productive working reiat -

termed The INS COTR was not fulh effective in remedyinc these problem* with FSMOR or in
mea>aung the local d.sputes among the various operational components.

EOIR ^MnP^ these issues t0 ^ Office, INS

fo management made concerted efforts to remedy the situation These effom led

lT£ m r m m 5? hearing Pr ° CeSS ' but P r0 ^ ess was slow due ^ the size of the iZdes
that had to be overcome. Meanwhile, the administrative hearing process was not proceed^ a
timely mann er and many detainees were experiencing delays in their cases. At

'f ,CUhieS h3d markedl >' im P r0Ved due 10 const *« effort and h^d
uork to remedy the sttuanon. Further improvements were planned. Nevertheless manv detainees
who had experienced delays remained in the facility. ' detainees

Pa g e4 -" July 20. 1995

CF 02369

Statistics On Removals:

detained

against the approximately 88,000 iiLta^d^^KMOR Z f ^
length of stay in the facility of 78 to 80 days tS K * P * detainee average

that many aliens were housed at different^" ' h ° WeVer ' does not account for *e fact

detentJisprobab^^^

cases processed. From the time ESMOR opened in WiS^iTf ?* nUmbei " ° f
an average docket of 256 active cases. ffc^Zmf " ^ ^ ^ WaS
Immigration Judge level Of the 89? r«.. ? J 11 ° f 1 153 cases rece > v ed through the
and removal J^k SZ^^^^^f 1 ^.^luding release
removal were issued Of the rf« ««i 7 , fmal orders ' a total of 66 ^ orders for

under an orders^ J^^Xl^SS 55 ° ^ ~

a low number of removals even for^ew " g CXClUdable this is

Statistics On Delays in the Hearing Process:

exclusion cases within three dT^ The n , f mmS 10 ScheduIe flrst hea "ngs for

1 4 days for ^ T ^ " ^ and

the detainee to receive an initial hearm. Ov e 1 s thW * T/ ^ W£ekS f ° r
average rose. In April the average tiZ m » r , ^ mhS ° f facillt - v P era »°n. this

day^andin, ^il-^^'^^^J^™^^^

23 days on,; (2) of 17 cases received t^f^m*^ ™? T SChedU ' ed
five were set two weeks out and four w,\J ... .V ' ei 8 ht we '= set for the next day.

on May 9. .995, two we^^or ,h! „!! V 7 *" W " kS ° Ul; ^ < 3 > of se ™ received
and one was se« 30 ^Z^y^ZtZ^ZZZ'" '° ""''r " 24 ^ s «■
to reschedule the initial hearin" TwTrH J? * mtMby from aRon '^

numbers of case reTe tot i ^ I hon „W ^'"T maSto Calendar < inK <° *«°"n' *>' high
no.if.ed ESMOR X^^^^^ «* «~ Winces wno

Pa = e46 July 20. 1995

CF 02370

For those cases ,n which a detainee applied for relief from deportation (the relief souuht was
almost exclusively asylum), EOIR statistics indicate that the average length of time from the" initial
hearing to an Immigration Judge decision was about four and one half months (134 davs) For the
penoc I from February 1, to June 22 the average was over five months (160 days). At the time of the
disnirbance (June 18), this situation appeared to be improving significantly. The number of pending
asylum applications had dropped from a high of 249 to 72. In addition, of the 47 cases which were
pending more than 90 days, 37 were scheduled for individual hearings within three weeks.

As a result, a detainee who applied for asylum could expect, on average, to be detained for
about five months before receiving a decision from an Immigration Judge. Close to a third of the
cases in which an asylum application was submitted (including those cases where the application
was later wthdrawn) took six months ( 1 80 days) or more. EOIR's goal is to complete these cases
within three months. The nanomvide average for exclusion cases where an application for relief is
««1 » four months- EOIR statistics indicate that 394 detainees filed asylum applications, and that
72 of these were withdrawn before a decision was reached by the Immigration Judge.

Ann^lfSfrr 5 M h ° 3PPealed Immi £ ration Jud g e ' s Vision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BI A) could expect an average of three additional months of detention. EOIR statistics
indicate that 1 5 1 appeals were filed.

aV( ™, D f ta ?n ? f d " 0t aPPiy f ° r rdief fr ° m de P ortatio " ™u\d expect to be detained, on
axerage, for 20 days before receiving an exclusion order from an Immigration Judee (this averaae
may be somewhat misleading, as it includes cases where the detainee indicated the intention to file
an asylum apphcauon. but later decided not to file). The nationwide average for all detained cases
is 1j days.

Causes of Delay in the Hearing Process:
INS shortfalls

The INS contributed to delays in the hearing process by failing to include sufficient
proyis.ons m the contract with ESMOR to- m ensure that ESMOR would present detainees on time
ror neanngs. u, ensure that the hearing schedule specified in the contract provided sufficient time
periods for immigration hearings: and (3) ensure sufficient flexibility on the part of ESMOR to
accommodate the continuation of individual hearings past the normal courtroom schedule where
necessary to efficiently conclude a hearing. Sufficient input was not obtained from EOIR
concerning these contract provisions, affecting the efficiency of the hearing process. The contract
also failed to ensure that the court holding room was constructed with a bathroom. The lack of a
bathroom in this room made it difficult for ESMOR to use this room effectively.

Even though the contract was deficient in some respects, the INS COTR appears to have been
unable to resolve some of these problems with ESMOR in a timely manner, and was not fully

Page 47

July 20. 1995

CF 02371

■o opm.e with the grea ,es, p„fi ^^"T^ """ionship which was .ecessao'

suffice eflbrts ,„ achieve . long . Krm solutio / by W *4^ *™ 8 «««. «*»

The INS district also contributed to deiav* in th„ i,

decision-making regarding location of custody ^eL^T* T thr ° Ugh inconsiste <»
jails to house detainees with cases on anneal fnr Z Z J? f appr0ach Was t0 ^ Pennsylvania
to Pennsylvania jails bj^^^^^^^^^tn^al
Assessment Team learned that in somTcS de Jnl« i T w » l vm ^pleted. In addition, the
at ESMOR for their scheduled ^ hearin 2s ThttT f l0Cati ° nS Were not P resented

according to EOIR records § * ** m reSUlted in •PP~ximately 21 continuances

mannertwh^

ESMOR detention facilitv. The INS mSStf^SI,^?^ 1 ' Penns y lvania jails and the
of its choosins. However" the Asses^^T ) 5 L ° ? C0Un excludab1 ^ aliens at the location
counsel of .cord when tht d ~ " *"? ~» dto d ' d - notify

hearing process by causing hearings to be cominuTd " dela >' S in the

This us™ tiziiTz: l ^:rr ,ist ! r ed inside the ™»* d —

advice and representation to Z nee Ad" on ^v Th ^ "J™ *" ° r ,0W cost
should be able to place telephone calls tt hZ nr^ ^ n0t Pr ° Vide that detaine «

numbers can be programmed into me nri a i ° rgani2atl0ns att0 ™ys free of charge (these
organ 12 ations gener'a.lv do no tc it™ *T ^ 31 ESM ° R) - Since^Aom,
represent, indigent detainees ^^22^ detaineCS ^ d ° ^
provided grounds for Immigration Judge to tit Ion o ^an.zat.ons. This situation

counsel. e gCS l ° grant lon 2 er continuances for a detainee to obtain

During initial visits bv attorney FSMOR
iu.delines.wh.charecurrenm- under^V e! b^NS^a T ^'^ ^ ^ art0me; - visilalion
of Appearance as Attorney or R^ml^iA ^^^^ '° ^ F ° m G " 28 (Notice
Some anorneys thought it "improper ZZe ^Z r 1' bef ° re granting access t0 a d *ainee.

Cent relate, -aresS^

aUheE^S"^^

Page48 July 20. 1995

CF 02372

benefits under the law. The Assessment Team believes that such a program would contribute to an
efficient hearing process, especially at facilities such as ESMOR which process exclusion cases The
program would enable detainees to make quick and informed decisions whether to apply for relief
or to admit excludability. The INS has been working on this program at the Headquarters, Regional
and District levels, but progress has been slow.

The INS Office of the General Counsel was unable to fully staff the ESMOR facility with
trial attorneys and clerks due to lack of resources. The trial attorneys assigned worked overtime to
keep up with the caseload, but sometimes did not have enough time to fully prepare for court.

Contractor problems

Delays in the hearing process were caused by a failure on the part of ESMOR to efficiently
move detainees to and from immigration court, and to present them for hearings in a timely manner.
This was further aggravated by the fact that local representatives from ESMOR. the INS. and EOIR
were unable to work together to resolve operating difficulties at the scheduled weeklv meetings.
This finding is supported by comments, memoranda, and letters provided to the Team from INS.
ESMOR, EOIR. and independent attorneys who complained about the manner in which ESMOR
the INS and EOIR conducted court business. EOIR has indicated that throuehout the term of the
operation of the facility. ESMOR was consistently late by 10-15 minutes in presenting aliens for
master calendar hearings. In addition. ESMOR's mandator}' policy to lock down detainees at 1 1 :00
a.m. and 4:00 p.m. removed any flexibility the court may have wished to exercise in hearina
additional cases and continuing cases past the cutoff times where necessary.

ESMOR was also unable to move detainees in such a manner as to avoid deiavs in master
calendar hearings. The main reason was an ESMOR policy, approved bv INS. to allow into the
courtroom only a small number of detainees at one time. This policv was followed during master
calendar hearings, notwithstanding a desire of the Immigration Judge to hear cases in larger (more
efficient) groups. Additionally. ESMOR's practice of terminating detainee movement at 1 1 00 a m
and 4:00 p.m. to conduct head-counts or provide other services (some of which were required under
the contract), sometimes resulted in continuances being granted or delays in the hearing process.

in late 1 994. in a meeting with the EOIR Court Administrator, OIC Michael Rozos told the
Administrator that he should provide in writing to INS any requests for modifications needed to
accommodate the hearing process. Officer Rozos advised the Administrator that he would pursue
any requested changes with the ACBADM Contracting Officer for the appropriate contract
modification. No written requests were ever received by INS.

Page 49 July 20. 1995

CF 02373

EOIR staffing:

Hearings were held at ESMOR for detainees who arrived at JFKIA and NEWIA but who
were located « other fac.hties. As a result, the Immigration Judges at ESMOR werehandHng
excluaon heanngs for approximately 300-350 detainees once the ESMOR facilitv reach d «£Sf
The average active caseload was 256 cases. By usual standards, this would mdicateTe nied for
two permanent InTrmgration Judges to be stationed on-site. In coordination with EO IR^e fecility
was bu.lt to accommodate two permanent Immigration Judges and their staffs^

EOIR did not assign a permanent Immigration Judge to the facility until February 1995
(seven months after the facility opened). Initially, EOIR was only able to pXiTe he eSent of

T at K ESM ? R b> ' SChedUling VisiUng j^ es St * ioned * NeSew York

S^F^SSTf ^ gh ° - 1 £ C ° Untr> '- 711656 jUdgCS had m exist ^ caseload ' were rotated
through ESMOR for short t.me mtervals. In late 1994, EOIR increased the schedule of visitins

judges. After February. EOIR provided the equivalent of two permanent judges at me ?ac lit" bv
supplementing the permanent judge with visiting judges.

F^opT,? ink if Uy aSSig , ned ° ne ° n " Site administr *tive clerk to the facilitv. Staffina at the
ESMOR facilit>\ with its caseload of 256 active cases for 300-350 detainees' if it were to be
comparable to EOIR staffing at other INS facilities where exclusion cases are conducted shouH

^ n ^ f 7 t ™TL E t ° lR I'f 5 - C ™ ly - dUC 10 ***** Sh0 ^ es - EOIR anemp* !o
stafl at a ratio of mo clerks to each Immigration Judge. In December 1994, EOIR added two

additional clerks to the facihty. A third was assigned in March. The clerk who was initi^ v

ass,gned to the facility was hired from the United States Attorney's Office and had no t or

N>rk nc a e „dT ng :rT a ; ion r eedings - He was b >- * ^

Newark and by another clerk in Newark.

th„ ^° IR adm u if lra i or wh0 was handling the existing Newark District docket was given

A^erm^nem Qju^ah ' erseem ^ «he ESMOR hearing process from his location in Newl
A permanent Court Administrator was stationed on-site in the latter pan of May.

- , m , l^° me T? C ° minUed f ° r Signif ' Can: Deri0ds 0f time In some in ^ces. , appears tha-
>ome Immigration Judges would grant an adjournment or continuance of one month to aTow a
detainee to obtain counsel. In some cases, the Assessment Team found continual fin exces of

% m Htnm m T hearing ^ 10 the next < for reasons whi <* are not yet clea^ Th T^m has
prov,ded EOIR wnh ten examples for further investigation and response

Efforts to Remedy Delays in the Hearing Process:

The INS Newark District informed EOIR that there were numerous problems with the
heanng process at the facility, including the lack of sufficient EOIR resources. In Octobl 1994 t
District Director ™te a detailed memorandum to the Regional Director. ^6^0^

Page 50 July20. 1995

CF 02374

IoTr D EO.R iStlLTu ™ S T m ° ra " dUm Was °° '° D« Headquarters and ,o
torn. EOIR Director Anthony Moscato, along with Newark District Director Warren Lewis J~

(Da D^to^Si" PartiCU ^ d T nS ™ e * C W0 * P" iM ° taP">vin E the situation-

(1 ) a December 12, 1 994 memorandum from Chief Immigration Judee Michael I rt,™,,„r™5

aX ^effort™ o^lT •'" ed S0 ' U,i0nS '° ' he °" P-biem7arfte eSr

facilirv in F,.kr„a„. a . .u f ome ' t0IR P ,aced a permanent Immigration Judee at the

^el'LpuXr ,995 °' d ' S, " ba " Ct - ^ ™ « 10 add « —

Planning the ESMOR Facility:

« the Mm ' e V ' nS ,lK Pr ° V,SIOnS ° f "* relali "S '» «" hearing process

from New Ynrir « rt w».,.„ i c u , J g me ' tOIR d,d com m»t to moving a position

%£&tSX ^f^^~r m Immigration Judge (The iLSon
bSTSS™!.!^ 199 J«nd«he position was filled in Newark by February 1995). The INS

coTe 1 Sf 2?^! d T ,Cd ?f sis t0 H Q° DP «PWnmg the shortfalls of L ^o
the iac.lm with us.tmg judges. Subsequently, HQDDP again wrote EOIR in January 1994

Page 51

Jul> 20. 1995

CF

Yo, k user fee cLs a, S^SL** ^ a " T'

the^emng of the ESMOR facHit, wouid be added ,„ E^/^^^

The INS and EOIR make independent budget reaue^ tn th» t ♦• r%
Management Division (JDMD). The JDMD ee n!rliK , ^P 3 *™" 1

intradepanmentalagencieUutle vesopen ^cS^^T Z^ 6 ™* *' betWeen
given project such as the ESMOR facility Z S« v fJ r T™ " ° n 8

intended to fill this purpose. ' Uepartment s DetenUon Coordination meetings are

be for t^SD^ Oneoptionmight

£xs r cou,d iden,i * ,hf

conflicts earlv 7^ L ■ could P^ide a more formal basis on which ,o resolve fundins

Z^&Z^^JZgZZS? 0nce plan is final ™

:™er^^

Program. 5 re<,Ue$lmg """S" a PP roval for < h = Institutional Hearing

in „ s Ja^S; 1 ^ ^^trss arr ,NS and E0, «

^—-on^e.Oete^

providedTS^^

' ' p T S,t f SIT' dda5S ^ * "* la * rf «—

1 d^°S" b! ' T hiCh T ntraCt re " uiremems ««« niade concerning EOIR functions
rftec^T* mVOlVe E0,R ta "* Planntag Md Nto-n-L. the operant

J.

The JNS must make efforts to include EOIR in all planning aspects that directly

Pa § e52 July 20. 1995

CF 02376

^XZ^^ added t0 improve c — ~«* -

Local personnel from ESMOR, INS, and EOIR continued to have adversarial
relauonsrups that were not in the best interest of the aliens or the three panils Thf

S^SvT ^ ^ 3t highCr leVdS - H0WCVer ' -ersight"ou Id ™
2 I k ° r ° VerCOnie SCVere P ers ^ity conflicts, in particular those
developed between the EOIR court administrator and ESMOR's Facili v

-fnti^

Recommendations:

a.

turn relationship, to identify and resolve problem areas.

SK « te S ™ f faciIity " This would ensure the —

^^^^ Sh ° Uld ^ — 10 — Ganges needed

tltdtms then 6nSUr M tha L C °T e 1 f ° r d6taineeS 3re ^ rised of the <™sf er of
their clients. W hen poss.ble. they should be notified prior to the transfer.

^S^^; e ^ det3ineeS *™ ~» » a current list of ^

S^SS" have the opportuni ty 10 make free te,ephone cal,s xopro bo »° ^

INS Headquarters should publish its policy on whether or not there is a need for
attorneys to Hie Form G-28 (Notice of Appearance of Attorney or Representative
in order to visit non-client detainees in custody. representative)

toTaTauhe 1 mt f^T * t0 3 Pr ° b ° n ° pr ° gram at ESM0R > similar

to tnat at the INS facility m Florence, Arizona.

The contract should be modified to require ESMOR to establish practices that bener
accommodate the defined needs of the Immigration Court.

Pa S e53 July 20. 1995

CF 02377

j- INS should work with EOIR to better Hanfi. „♦

to new detention facilities 5 m ^ Stage " ***** issu « related

When ESMOR opened in August of 1 994 there «»«
interview, for any detained asylum \ppZ^SZ^^ f° r^*" " P,aCC t0 COnduct APS0
Counsel's office. After the District CoSbe^ rLl ° f reS0UrCeS in Newark Dis ^t
were generally made by the deJS^^Sl ^"T^ ^ toterviews ^ ues *
detail a trial attorney from Swanton V«3toc^th ^ made ^^ents to

conducted during details betwee S 1994 ?^ ^^ faterviews - interviews were
approximately six weeks apart. Thes wl T7 ,995 ' The detai,s were s P^ed
were experienced. Because of the spac" but a few problems

several weeks to receive their interview? if Ju£ ' " nUmber of detainees ha d to wait
transport of detainees being held in P^Z^^!^*" }* 1 * * 0ccurred

in the timelv

cases, the APSO interviewer and the alilZ lZZl l^ f °! SCheduled APS0 - In a few
the detainee to arrive. In April 1 W5 S N^lSS f°T *** ^ ™™™ time for

-aNewarktrialattomeywasdesignat.^

recommended parole (release) to the District nfrelr ™ KC ™ ed 0ne - The Ap SO

23 cases the APSO recommended conSS^ST ^ ^ "* in the remainin *

decision by the District Director in response^ oTaP^O CO f onl - v ° ne P aro1 "

asylum grants for the ESMOR docket is current v 14"/ S ° ' eCOmmendations - The rate of EOIR
cases), according to EOIR statistics. > ( grantS ° Ut of 250 c °mpleted asylum

immigra^^ ^SSe^ ST""" ^ ^ ^ * «*

before an Immigration Judee. Thi is a ^^ST^ *»? CaSeS « P endir * » hearine
In the rema.ning nven, -three c,s^!^ ^^^i ^ ' ° f ? ^pleied cases,~
were granted withholding of deportation iZc^ts^T ^ 8nmied aS >' ,Um - th «*
suggest that the alien has not yet appl ed for as^m %l P *' m tW ° C3Ses E0IR re ^ds
of 19 completed cases). S>lum ' Thls 15 a 8 rant rate of approximately 37% (7

wise use f detention space while
the long processing times at ESMOR. «tSnae^?o^ ,0n Z ^ ^^"^ers. Given
35 cases in which the Immigration J^^^JT"' 1 ^ ^ ^ g0als - The
Program. AstrongerAPSOprogram^lf™

Pa ge 54 ■ , _ _

July 20, 1995

CF 02378

Diana Director's parole decisions to ■hTr.L™. ^ ra,se ,'" ,es,io " s <*<>«• *e relation of the
su.is.ics raise oueLns regarZg how we 7Z%£S « ^ * "* — ,he
ulumatt asylum decision by .he Irnmisranon jud~ .! '«°mmenda.,ons corresponded to the
APSO is more generous Z tha, /udge" ^ * fc

Recommendations :

a.

More resources should be devoted to the APSO

program.

" ^T h ^°Z^^ * » — <- — U greater

it takes to process a case. ' the,r Case ' '- e - the len 8 th of time

d ' ^ cxecuted should be —

^ Review nf*h» rc Mop Hi (mj^

The Assessment Team reviewed the ESMOR disturbance in the fol,o>vi ng areas:

A. Known / Probable Causes of Disturbance

«• On-Site Response to Disturbance , 7

Disturbance and Aftermath „
D. Damage Assessment

page 56
57
59
61

« s„ A tota, of 3 i 5 detatnees were nou ^^^^

The disturbance was under control hv Am -
enforcement officers. Newark ££^y£^*Z * WaS performed «V law

enforcement officers, ten ambulances and v^tsTe^ , ^^^ely 140 to 150 law
disturbance. 3001,5 medical Personnel were on site as a result of the

PagC55 July 20. 1995

CF 02379

• -view of .he

and review ESMORs response and ^5SS^^ Wrftedi ~ , -«

ma personnel, and off-site detainee interviews.
^ K "»Tn »nd/or Prnhahi, r n m n ni^ rr bi , n . r

The fo„owi„g , is , of causes identifies tne major factors contributing , the disnirbanM

peers. Harassment by guards was mainly psychological, or verbal"

issues and detainee 7a tt'alyst" C0 " di,i ° nS ° f <°° f "™™

EXC^rd^eesI „ , ™ S f3Cte te «*- * ™ -*

possible leeal processes «~,™i„ , 5 10 avail *™selves of all

detainees ^'^ScT^ST^^ * *"■*»• The

from their attempted illega, ^^^t^^ d " en "°" ^

INS personnel a, the fac" e inelT T" ** «■»■■*■*» ™"

INS lav throuch ESMOR ouard- i°f '^normal path for communication to

register a complain, " "* ^ Pe ° P ' e a " 01 " " h ° m wished to

calendars. Someofmedeuineesatoclnil Tr ? "* mconsiste "oy h EOIR

oipro bono attorneys TheTc ata 'a t^ T "k^* re P res «"»«on tactics

cases and would no rep esen 1™ "™ at,0nK!,S " refer « rain W« of
represent many detatnees for reasons that the detainees feu were

Paae 56 . .

July 20, 1995

CF 02380

discriminatory. Additionally some detainees comnlaineH n fA ■

some private attorneys representing deEs of ^ept.ve practices by

& - On - Site Response tn th„ p f ?t1 TTT TInrr

^^^Z^"^^^ and notes concerning how ESMOR
persons who had been on-site at the J^S^^X^T^ T" -nd
all trammg lesson-plans and curriculum mataJ^^n^K^? 6111 Tm haS requested
to the disturbance. The followine aSo^^^Z ^ eVa,uate ES MOR's response

by ESMOR management, Office rV^Zs r^t * ** Assessment Team

confidential informant), and four ESMOR guards ^ * 1 INS (includin S a

The disturbance began in housing unir "F- ? ^
was car ied out by five defainees i^ZL ^^^ ^ ^ ^
and the detainees retreated. A second assaul brn£T, u Personnel responded to assist

assault being the housing unit eu ard Th Ztt' " " ^ " H " With the target of the
problem, ordered all housmg unit iLll^Z^^ ^ * be 3 Serious

separate assaults had occurred wifhin a shTrtlrS nf • ^ ^ a PP ro P riate oider since two
a.m.. detainees began assaultine the to 11? " ** ° rganized manner " At ™0

hallway. A single securitv ^■^S^ am T"* 1 * ° Ut 3nd int0 the
-ESMOR^

^ng^*^^ ^ thC faCiHty and P roceeded

security doors were locked in the onen n^;, Z ° * CUre P enmeter he noted *at both exterior
that detainees were assaultine the sSX2 s . .r*"^ ^ ^ he ° Wed
Control Room in an attempt to locate ESMOR personnel ^4 ^ He pr ° Ceeded t0 the

m the Control Room that the other ESMOR Z^u k b> ' the gUard statior * d

abandoned the facility. gU3rds Were ln the P a ^ing lots and that they had

*om th^ty tZ^^ ^ «"« «■« ^tainees retreated
lot and anempted to persuade a.d then dTc the E^n 7 ^ Pr ° Ceeded 10 the P ar ^ng
to establish order. ESMOR persorme, r ena ed Officer r H T ** in ™ attem P<

reaS f ss the disturbance. During this

«- was forced to evacuate from the s^

Pa§e5? July 20. 1995

CF 02381

ST ^ br0ke " ° f SeC " e d ° mi,MiK - im ° «« *»™*> of ,he interior

.he facii;," ss^,S s p rt from ,he ,imt esmor ««*

ESMOR guards made no anemp, to Z^T^ , Dwin * this time,

to call 91 1 , the local emergency LfstaTc ™°l ^ * °' ^ * e »*er than

g-ds had access to no, betas. £ ^d™ ecdve s'Stu 1°^" *" ESM ° R
equipment The refusa! of ESMOR »m£^££^^**^<«**>
response p,a„, afforded th e detainees bo,h toJ'nJ^^^J^g-™

■oca, * , , ^ By , he time

Additional delays in responding to the disturbanc, 1 V , bK " ate ' over ^ detainees

raised by local law enforcement enrWe Tor ,™ 7 f p D erlcnced due » jurisdictional concerns

uepartment was unwillin" to cnmmit in

example, the Patrol Sergeant for the Elizabeth Police
(because of concerns o4 juS on) I^TT ^ ^ COmmand aut horizati n.

facility (which was not InJ^T^l^^f m t w ^ * e S£CUre perimeter of the
guards (three males and onTftr^

Weapons and Tactical Team" (SWAT were Hi" , k T ^ ^ ^ Md Federal Special
situation. ( AT) WCre dlSpaIched 10 the Slte because of the potential hostage

Room ^^^^^ u ^^ miSSing ^ ds ^ *™ the Control
warehouse roof and the 'drop ce tit Th feml T™" the
assaulted (non-sexualh ) and slapp d bv Jm/«£? ^ , releaSed by detainees after
from the faciht, bv S^T^^^^^ ^ ««d was extricated

e~^m^^

entry into the faciln, "a^ fi « ams reIated injuries death. The

o: wh,ch were caused bs glass and oth t IV ."'"T bemg trealed f ° r m,nor * 0Und *- most
were treated and released ^ t i age o^^^,*? ^ aCt, ° nS ' detai —
No officers were injured. ° SpUalS after m,nor treatment for their injuries.

Page58 Jul.v20.I995

CF 02382

1 • Thirteen ESMOR guards one

Present i„ the f adIily Wnm ^ZSggg «««. - .he INS COTR were

5 - ESMOR personnel made no effort ,n ♦ •

emergency operations. ^ " eme ^ncy equipment or prepare for

6. ESMOR had

^guard ta ^ 10 "- <>™ procedures or l0

ESMOR guards mad

**» -e i„ itial , v s:;:^ *<*«• « ,-

8- The departure of F<s\/fr»D

v - Some securitx doors were l,»fv ~ u

access *^^**g~. «~ ~* de taine ,

f^'^^^teSsS'^'^ C ? n1 "" R ° 0m « uard ^i'ed to release
d«ainees inside the facili" "'"P" 8 ,he *■* S^ard and tMinvZ^L

Critical time was lost due tn tf,„

The ESMOR norH "esponse of ESMOR guards to the disturbance.

^ a disturhan^Sf ^ ™ —4 ™* wereno, prep^d

10.

11.

12.

Page 59

July 20, 3 995

CF 02383

The Assessment Team-feund the ESMOR f a ~v*
smallest disturbances. The rapid depart TV* * ^ but the

to gain additional support from otheSneefwho ^lln^ f° Wed rebdIious deta ^
m the disturbance. h0 Were not llkeI y to have otherwise participated

security window. Observing this . Officer S^^T,^ ^ U ^ '* tt «°* ta *'=
the facility i„ an attempt ,„ restore order ESMO^f, r t'^ ESM0R ^ l ° re "™er
concludes tha, ESMOR guards did no, ^n^Sm ZZn ■ ^ ASSKSmeffl Te ™

no, prepare them for this type of confrontation H»Jf1S ""^ ttainil « md experience did
trained, and had staff™ been at a pTp e" ° e l *t H ^ k bee " e W«i and

certainly could have been C ° uld have been called. I,

arrived, controlled until additional assistance from local authorities

^^^^^ Team «* - *» *

shift. A flaw in the original statement of wX Ki no, 1 r, C0Ver *" P os,s du ™8

government to increase s,affi„ a proponionate to det P , " IC , qummw °" contractor bv the
personnel would have been n K ;ZTcZ"« oo^T ^'l ^ C ° nC ' Ude a mi " ta ™ °«0
on the pan of ESMOR and the INS tie Ass ssm „f T m ' dm8ht Shift " This is b ° th a " "or
-en, staff, maintain the minimum posts ^^^™Z^< -

ESMOR^^rSev W SabTand "T™ "°* ^ - »

weekend June 17-18. " ^"^^'^^^^'stafrtocoverthefacili.yonlhe

s^^l"^,^^^^ ** >°«**»*™ shakedown and
Severa, iav. en.brcemen, om^£^ < 2Z? b * ,ad . b ™« hM - ™ ad hoc enclosure
toward detainees, once the i a ^^^^S^?^° tm * mL ' naB ^

area when it was apparent that the detataeeThaTh Tf ? PUShmg detainees """""l <he staging

no. request any further assistance from them The FIlHsri t 8 f dS ° U ' of "» ^ ^ «

investigation, concerning allegations w h ar2 ™ of ,h SS"*, *" 3 C ' Vil

are also underway ,o determme whether or InVeS,igati ° nS

Pa § e 60 r , "

July 20. 1 995

CF 02384

A few ESMOR personn I
Such incidents were indicative n f*u

Damage to Physical Plant:

' 'Owe major components were

comrol elecToS SKSTT. "-*' in ™m area All mo ■,

This uni k, P d closed Clrcu t television (CCT\^ 1 monit <>rs. a main door-

were destroyed Th»~ • • P r Some cinder block wall s „^ j Mos t of the sinks

Page 61

July 20. 1995

CF 02385

off fire sprinkler nozzles. The facility .

causing the disturbance. lht> dld n0t P erm,t coking, thus no fires were w u u

c,c set 0)' those

Electrical and Utility Damage:

As indicated on Das»p kv«
- ** fcC ' 1 "' — *~ PeP ° r '' " •""> 8 ES ^0 R o„«fi ed INS (ha , „ pairs

Detain?* vVf>|f 1r£

ESMOR should be required m c u •

Procedure which de^^^» ^ J* a p, an f action 0r poIicv and
cedents which involves a derate " notif > the *S COIR of an '

ESMOR should be required ,n « -

what acnons thev took to resolve tVco^ *«» and 3 ™

J ul.v 20, 1995

CF 02386

o ESMOR should be required to notify the INS COTR ■

Policy and procedures for review and a PP roval ° f ^ chan S e in

o INS should physically inspect the segregation unit daily.

o INS should require ESMOR to develoo and i m „i
whtch ensures aliens depart oHE^

valuables, as required under thTcont^u ^ &U *undV and

of P^^^^^^ 1 ^^ I™ 5 /"?;' St0ragC md accountin g
the proper safeguards of all detainee prope^ ^ Pr0CedUre for

^^^l^ lOP 3n emergenC> ' reS P° nse to react to emergent
&e»Wl1inf»iindlH^ fT .i^ Ttntrnli

ESMOR should provide to INS all • a

personnel. If necessary, the contrac ThonM ^j 1 ^' re P°"s on ESMOR
compliance. (R e: l n terminating V,. Z Jl ° ° 6 m ° dlfied to ref l«t this to

ensure

taken the finding must be reported ) wJi, ° ther PerS ° nneI actions

a ™ch clearer picture of emp^etll^ ^

o The contract should be mod . fied

intervene m practices which may adverselTaffectth^NS " " t0

Staffing and Pmon„,.| y^„ n ,

o

CF 02387

Training

INS should require ESMOR tn

should be monitored, and ESMOR should be rem - ^ ^»«affing plans
requtrements including, but not IteS 1 J?,™^ '° COm P l >' ^* porting

ssc— SKIM

^^XT^c^rsx.™ 1 • with

The contract should be modified to reflect th»

guard series, to attract better v^^^^ C,assifica *°n change in the

"X^^^:^:^ glance to ensure all ESMOR
Based upon the past performance of the Securitv nffi

expressed by RODDP. HQSEC should rnn" * ° ffiCer and the lack of confidence

^^^^^--^^

and onentation i n a timely manner. appropnate amount of training

Page 64

CF 02388

Food Servjo?

complaLrabomfofd^dfte^^ l ? m ° r ! close, y monitor detainee

detainees with specific reS ponTes C ° mplamtS h3VC merit > and P™ide the

Medical C m

° t^^^Z^ * services provided on-site.

prudent given the caJ^^^^T* ^ * ^ C ° St effective ^
in Service custody. q Uld * detamee not receive appropriate care while

Access to Coun^f / y^x> ,

S g « i^otr " ' COnVe " ieM PlaCC VisiK,i0 " - -V -bseouer.,

3ho„,dbeab, el „ pr0 v ide LSoTttraXo n ups e ViSita,i °" """^ "«
The Physi cal Facile

S tTds Sh0U ' d ^ re, " ired » ™* <* -tract in adherence to ACA

o INS- procedure, ,„ accept a faciiitv for „ per a tio „ need , te
Contract r 9mp | ilnrr

o

o

incidents oraUegations If JL^ a T^coT°' Kp0n «*

outlined under the terms of the contract a " mely manner ' 25

££££2?-** W «— «* •*«*» of the sights in

Page 65 , . _

July 20. 1995

CF 02389

ESMOR must ensure a mom ♦•

oetamees to present their complaints. and/ ° r non -English speakino

^^^^^^^^

The use of staff on double shifts is „ h„ ,
V ' hen » becomes apnarenr th« • ..

appropriate coveraoe the cotp ' nadequate P ers °m>el are availah'- r

'n the daih ™„ i TRs should request that Rnnno tl ensure

July 20. 1 995

CF 02390

o Increase INS oversight of the contract to 24 hours a day, seven davs a week Thu
willensureproperperformanceofESMORstaff. y,sevenoa > sa neel - This

° v?„tati„°r " MdS 10 imn,ediate ' y Pm * «~ « -be of anv contract

" SSS" re,Uircd ,0 ^ ' imdy 10 *• ^ of «, y v,„U„ M of

o ESMOR must provide tiehter enntmic ™,«,,

must be reconcile nrinr t~ „ a . • , T , y aiscre P anc ies m these records

Becommenrifd Cnntrar* ^j^^ tinn .

o Identify appropriate levels of staffing per number of detainees for this specific site.

o Incorporate a requirement for a Oualitv Assuranrp Plan thot „ -j L

and the Government the detailed in fll , PrOVldeS the contra ctor

service is bdT nrnv^H ? informat ' on nec «sar>' to assure a high standard of

contractor and?\S to tal " ^ ^ INS * nCeds - This als ° allow the
ZeK aaion ' Pr ° aCtlVe aPPr0aCh in identi ^ P«*km areas and take

^-=^ - ~ -rations

° Si asl^the ^ 1 If mdlCat0rS agamSl WhiCh 10 measure the -n^ctor. This
prler^as ' "™* « ' leVd re ^ ired b >' ™ and identify

o Require quarterly reviews of the contractor's performance.

Page67 July 20. 1995

CF 02391

o Sufficient INS presence should be required in the facilitv n „ a „ t

week basis. If this recommendation LTemented bv tl seven - da >-*-
those DEOs assigned to the District SSS^^^^ D /° S > the
they were originally allotted. ^ 0Se for which

The New ?r fr Pjfftrirt

o All ESMOR's Post Orders Policies »„h p j

and approved bv RODDP andHOnnp^ Pr0Cedures shou,d be further re-reviewed
this report. ' HQ ° DP concurr «"ly within 30 days of the release of

INS' Juvenile IW n », nr ? » ][ry

-» minors commences whenk j££*J of ^ve^T *«*» ° f
Office nfS ffl|r jf»-

clearance system. P ° f pr ° blen,s ln P"^* utilizing ,„e security

ve,ed in.eres, in * »~ '

SZZf&Z^*" -—'ion. the D,s,ri« should f orm .
•0 ensure c 0mmlln i t . v ^rtcA&.S^ - -

Ztt^SttZ^-***-**-.*

July 20. 1995

CF 02392

INS must ensure that ESMDR ~ j-

open line of «n maaic J£?Z£^^* m Cxistias <" oblOT - An

T1 " ""ring fntm

.o nVXnta S«ef " ""*"'"*• " - -'V sta g e, fcndu* issues reiated
l^TS^T Sh ° Uld " e m ° dified - ■ '^es needed

w iS^zr ,hat de,a,neM — » = ««™ , isl 0{pm

" <° — *™ <ncn.c„, lect) teiephone calls

'^:^Z^: s ft^ whc,he : or " ot ,hcre * ■ - **

in order to vi„, „ on . clien , ™£ ° f »f Attorney „r Representative,

o The contact should be modified to require ESMOR tr, ~,.kr u

accommodate the defined needs of^S^ «««• *" better

Pa ? e70 I ■

July 20. 1995

CF 02393

AdaoHlfflgfmgnji

to the Team during this assignment.

Page 72

J ui> 20. 1995

CF 02394